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Abstract Data Types in Event-B – An
Application of Generic Instantiation
David Basin1, Andreas Fu¨rst1, Thai Son Hoang1, Kunihiko Miyazaki2, and
Naoto Sato2
1 Institute of Information Security, ETH Zurich
2 Yokohama Research Lab, Hitachi
Abstract. Integrating formal methods into industrial practice is a chal-
lenging task. Often, different kinds of expertise are required within the
same development. On the one hand, there are domain engineers who
have specific knowledge of the system under development. On the other
hand, there are formal methods experts who have experience in rigor-
ously specifying and reasoning about formal systems. Coordination be-
tween these groups is important for taking advantage of their expertise.
In this paper, we describe our approach of using generic instantiation to
facilitate this coordination. In particular, generic instantiation enables a
separation of concerns between the different parties involved in develop-
ing formal systems.
1 Introduction
Event-B is a formal method for modelling safe and reliable systems. Industrial
awareness of Event-B has been enhanced by recent collaboration projects (e.g.,
DEPLOY [4]). These projects acted as a bridge for deploying research results in
various industrial contexts with considerable success. Moreover, they also high-
lighted several challenges in integrating formal methods into industrial develop-
ment processes. In particular, questions about interactions between developers
with different kinds of expertise often arise during the deployment. On the one
hand, engineers have domain knowledge including how the systems should work
and why they work, but often find it challenging to formalise their reasoning.
On the other hand, formal method experts, which do not have inside knowledge
about the specific systems, have experience in reasoning formally about systems
in general.
In this paper, we propose adapting the concept of abstract data types to
Event-B to enable the interaction between the domain and formal methods ex-
perts. Abstract data types allow developers to hide implementation details that
are initially irrelevant to the development of a system. As a result, systems de-
veloped with abstract data types are more intuitive and easier to verify. The
realisation of the abstract data types can be done via generic instantiation by
Event-B experts. In particular, the choice of which (concrete) data structure to
use to represent the abstract data type can be done independently of the actual
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system under development. Later, generic instantiation in Event-B enables the
Event-B expert to prove that the chosen data structure is a valid realisation of
the abstract data type.
Generic instantiation in Event-B was introduced in [3] and further elaborated
in [8]. These works show how generic instantiation works with other standard
techniques in Event-B such as refinement and composition. This paper illustrates
how abstract data types can be modelled and realised using generic instantiation.
Similar to our work is the recently developed Theory Plug-in [6]. The primary
usage of the Theory Plug-in is to extend the mathematical language to include
new data types. A theory module also provides an encapsulation of datatypes
and enables the separation of concerns between the data types and the models
that make use of them. The main difference between our work and the Theory
Plug-in is that data types are usually developed together with their properties
within the same theory module. As a results, the data types developed using
the Theory Plug-in are usually already concrete. There is no clear separation
between actual representation of data types and their abstract properties. More
information on related work is in Section 5.
Structure In Section 2 we will give a brief overview of Event-B and generic
instantiation in Event-B. We describe our approach in Section 3. In Section 4 we
demonstrate our methodology of splitting the modelling effort on an example.
In Section 5 we compare our approach with other existing approaches and in
Section 6 we draw conclusions.
2 Background
2.1 The Event-B Modelling Method
Event-B [1] is a modelling method for formalising and developing systems whose
components can be modeled as discrete transition systems. Event-B is centered
around the general notion of events and its semantics is based on transition
systems and simulation between such systems, as described in [1]. We will not
describe in detail the semantics of Event-B here. Instead we just give a brief
description of Event-B models, which are important for generic instantiation.
Event-B models are organised in terms of two basic constructs: contexts and
machines. Contexts specify the static part of a model whereas machines specify
the dynamic part. Contexts may contain carrier sets, constants, axioms, and
theorems. Carrier sets are similar to types. Axioms constrain carrier sets and
constants, whereas theorems are additional properties derived from axioms. The
role of a context is to isolate the parameters of a formal model (carrier sets and
constants) and their properties, which are intended to hold for all instances.
Machines specify behavioural properties of Event-B models. Machines may
contain variables, invariants (and theorems), and events. Variables v define the
state of a machine and are constrained by invariants I(v). Theorems are addi-
tional properties of v derivable from I(v). Possible state changes are described
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by events. An event evt can be represented by the term
evt =̂ any t where G(t, v) then S(t, v) end ,
where t stands for the event’s parameters, G(t, v) is the guard (the conjunc-
tion of one or more predicates) and S(t, v) is the action. The guard states the
necessary condition under which an event may occur, and the action describes
how the state variables evolve when the event occurs. We use the short form
evt =̂ when G(v) then S(v) end when the event does not have any parame-
ters, and we write evt =̂ begin S(v) end when, in addition, the event’s guard
equals true. A dedicated event without parameters and guard is used for the
initialisation event (usually represented as init).
A machine can see multiple contexts. During the development, a context
extends one or more contexts by declaring additional carrier sets, constants,
axioms or theorems. An abstract machine can be refined by another concrete
machine. The variables of the abstract and concrete machines are related by some
gluing invariants. The existing events are refined accordingly to this relationship.
Moreover, new events can be added to the concrete machine. The new events
must refine a special skip event, which does not change the abstract variables.
2.2 Generic Instantiation in Event-B
Generic instantiation is a technique for reusing models by giving concrete values
for abstract parameters of the models. Generic instantiation for Event-B is first
mentioned in [3] and is further elaborated in [8]. We summarise the approach
as follows. Suppose we have an abstract development with machines M1 . . .Mn
and their corresponding contexts C1 . . .Cn as shown in Fig. 1. The development
is generic, with the carrier sets s and constants c from the contexts C1 . . .Cn
acting as its parameters. Assume that s and c are constrained by axioms A(s, c).
Mn(s, c)
M1(s, c)
Cn(s, c)
C1(s, c)sees
sees
refines extends
Dm(t, d)
D1(t, d)
extends
Nn(E(t, d), F (t, d))
N1(E(t, d), F (t, d))
refinessees
sees
Fig. 1. Generic instantiation in Event-B
The abstract generic model can be instantiated within another development
containing contexts D1 . . .Dm. Assume that the concrete contexts D1 . . .Dm
contain concrete carrier sets t and constants d, constrained by axioms B(t, d).
The instantiation is done by giving values for the abstract carrier sets s and
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constants c in terms of concrete t and d. Let the concrete expressions E(t, d)
and F (t, d) be the instantiated values for s and c respectively. Soundness for
generic instantiation requires us to prove that the instantiated abstract axioms
are derivable from the concrete axioms, i.e.,
B(t, d)⇒A(E(t, d), F (t, d)) .
In this paper, we further restrict the instantiation for the abstract carrier sets
s so that they can only be instantiated by type-expressions, i.e. E(t, d) must be
some type-expressions. This is because a carrier set S in Event-B is assumed to
satisfy two additional constraints (i.e., beside the stated axioms).
non-empty: S is non-empty, i.e., S 6= ∅.
maximal: S is maximal, i.e. ∀x·x ∈ S.
The maximal condition is due to the fact that the Event-B models are typed.
As a result, expressions used for instantiating carrier sets must be also some
type-expressions, i.e., satisfying the above two conditions.
Applying generic instantiation, machines N1 . . .Nn are instances of M1
. . .Mn by syntactically replacing s and c by E(t, d) and F (t, d). The advantage
here is that the instantiated machines are correct by construction. The resulting
model can be used in conjunction with other techniques such as refinement [3]
and composition [8].
3 Abstract Data Types in Event-B
An abstract data type is a mathematical model of a class of data structures. An
abstract data type is typically defined in terms of the operations that may be
performed on the data type with some mathematical constraints on the effects
of such operations. The advantage of using an abstract data type is that the rea-
soning can be done purely based on the properties of the operations, regardless
of the implementation. We want to use this idea in our developments. In partic-
ular the separation between the abstraction and the implementation enables us
to split the work between domain experts and formal methods experts.
An abstract data type and its operations can be captured straightforwardly
using contexts in Event-B. Generic instantiation can then be used to “imple-
ment” the abstract data type and prove that the actual implementation satisfies
the constraints on the effects of the operations. Our approach can be summarised
as follows.
Domain experts: The domain experts make use of some abstract data types and
operations defined within some context to model the system in Event-B.
Formal methods experts: The formal methods experts use generic instantiation
to include the details on how the abstract data types are represented and
prove that the representations satisfy the assumptions of the abstract data
types stated earlier.
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We illustrate the use of generic instantiation by a model of the standard
stack data type. A stack is a last in, first out (LIFO) data type that contains a
collection of elements. A stack is characterised by two fundamental operations:
push and pop. The push operation adds a new item to the top of the stack. The
pop operation removes the stack’s top element. A special constant empty stack
denotes the empty stack. The stack abstract data type can be modelled using a
context as follows. Notice that we have defined the “type” STACK TYPE as a
carrier set and the set of possible stacks STACK as a constant.
sets : STACK TYPE ,ELEM
constants : STACK , empty stack , push, pop
axioms :
axm0 1 : STACK ⊆ STACK TYPE
axm0 2 : empty stack ∈ STACK
axm0 3 : push ∈ STACK × ELEM → STACK
axm0 4 : pop ∈ STACK 7→ STACK
axm0 5 : dom(pop) = STACK \ {empty stack}
axm0 6 : ∀s, e ·s ∈ STACK ⇒ push(s 7→ e) 6= empty stack
axm0 7 : ∀s, e ·s ∈ STACK ⇒ pop(push(s 7→ e)) = s
In the representation of stack data type, each stack is represented by a pair
f 7→ n, where f represents the content of the stack and n represents the size
of the stack. Other operations of the stack data type are defined accordingly.
The concrete context used for instantiation is as follows. Note that we use set
comprehension to define the constants accordingly.
sets : ELEM constants : STACK , empty stack , push, pop
axioms :
axm1 1 : STACK = {f 7→ n | n ∈ N ∧ f ∈ 1 .. n→ ELEM }
axm1 2 : empty stack = ∅ 7→ 0
axm1 3 : push = {f ,n, e ·
f 7→ n ∈ STACK ∧ e ∈ ELEM |
((f 7→ n) 7→ e) 7→ ((f C− {(n + 1) 7→ e}) 7→ n + 1)}
axm1 4 : pop = {f ,n ·f 7→ n ∈ STACK ∧ n 6= 0 |
(f 7→ n) 7→ (({n}C− f ) 7→ n − 1)}
To prove that the representation of the stack data type is consistent with the
stack abstract data type, we can use instantiation where the abstract constants
are instantiated with concrete constants with the same name. The abstract car-
rier set STACK TYPE is instantiated with P(Z × ELEM ) × Z. The abstract
axioms (i.e., axm0 1 – axm0 7) must be derived from the concrete axioms (i.e.,
axm1 1 – axm1 4). This can be done by expanding the definitions of the concrete
constants accordingly.
4 Example
We illustrate our approach by modelling a set of trains on a railway network,
inspired by the example in [1, Chapter 17].
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4.1 Requirements Document
A railway network is divided into sections. An example of such a network is
showed in Figure 2, taken from [1, Chapter 17].
Fig. 2. Layout of a sample network with sections A to N.
A set of trains are moving within the network. Two important requirements
are that trains must not derail or collide. To avoid collision, the system must
ensure that each section is occupied by at most one train. Moreover, trains are
assumed to move only forward within the network.
SAF 1 For each section, at most one train occupies that section.
SAF 2 Trains are always on the network.
ASM 3 Trains only move forward.
4.2 Informal Discussion
An important part of the model will formalise the trains moving within the
network. Intuitively, a train can be seen as the sequence of consecutive sections
that it occupies within the network. There are different possible formalisation
of the trains, e.g., using functions relating occupied sections as in [1, Chapter
17], or modeling sequences as functions from integers to sections. However, the
system should be correct regardless of which modelling style is used to represent
the trains. In particular, the formalisation of the trains in Event-B is of little
interest to the domain experts. It would be easier for the domain experts to
model the trains at the more abstract level, i.e. with a train abstract data type.
The decision of which representation for the train data type will be decided by
the Event-B experts. In particular, different representations can be used for the
train data type via separate instantiation.
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4.3 Formal Model
Train Abstract Data Type We first formalise the train abstract data type
in a context, focusing on requirement SAF 1. In particular, we consider the
following “attributes” of a train: the sections that the train occupies (we refer
to them as the train’s area), the section of the train’s head (the end where the
train driver is sitting) and the section of the train’s rear (the opposite end). This
is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Train in the network occupying sections.
Let the set of sections be a carrier set SECTION . We abstractly repre-
sent the trains state by a constant TRAIN , that is a subset of the carrier set
TRAIN TYPE . Three function constants, namely area, head , and rear , are used
to get the information about the trains’ area, head position, and rear position,
respectively. For an abstract data type describing a train, one can see these
constants as operations of the data type.
area: takes a train state, returns a set of sections.
head : takes a train state, returns a section.
rear : takes a train state, returns a section.
In Event-B, we give the typing information for these constants using the following
axioms.
area Type : area ∈ TRAIN → P(SECTION )
head Type : head ∈ TRAIN → SECTION
rear Type : rear ∈ TRAIN → SECTION
Further constraints on these constants will be given later when they are needed
for maintaining the correctness of the machines that use this data type.
When a train moves, the set of sections it occupies changes. When moving
forward, ASM 3, the train’s head reaches the end of its head section and moves
to the new section ahead. Similarly, when the train’s rear leaves the train’s rear
section, the rear is reassigned. The train’s area is updated accordingly: it is
extended to include the new head section when the head moves, and the rear
section is removed when the rear moves. As a result, we define two additional
operations for manipulating the train.
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add head : takes a train state and a section, returns a train state.
front : takes a train state, returns a train state.
In Event-B, we give the type for these constant as follows.
add head Type : add head ∈ TRAIN × SECTION 7→ TRAIN
front Type : front ∈ TRAIN 7→ TRAIN
Note that we use partial functions to indicate that there are some constraints
for extending the train’s head and removing the train’s rear.
Finally, we define an additional operation new train to create a new train
when the train enters the network from a particular section.
new train Type : new train ∈ SECTION → TRAIN
System Model Using Train Abstract Data Type Using the train abstract
data type, the system can be straightforwardly modelled. Let TRAIN ID be the
set of possible IDs for trains in the network. The variable trains represents the
trains currently monitored by the systems, which is a mapping from train IDs
to actual trains. Initially, trains is assigned the empty set ∅.
variables : trains
invariants :
trains ∈ TRAIN ID 7→ TRAIN
Three events enter, extend head, remove rear are used to model the different cases
where a train enter the network, a train extends its head to a new section, and
a train removes its rear section.
enter
any t , s where
t /∈ dom(trains)
s ∈ SECTION
then
trains(t) := new train(s)
end
extend head
any t , s where
t ∈ dom(trains)
s /∈ area(trains(t))
then
trains(t) := add head(trains(t) 7→ s)
end
remove rear
any t where
t ∈ dom(trains)
head(trains(t)) 6= rear(trains(t))
then
trains(t) := front(trains(t))
end
In particular the guard of extend head states that the new section s is not already
occupied by the train t , and the guard of remove rear states that the head and
the rear of the train t are in different sections. Moreover, these events lead us to
the following constraints about the domain of operations add head and front .
add head dom : dom(add head) = {t 7→ s | t ∈ TRAIN ∧ s /∈ area(t)}
front dom : dom(front) = {t | t ∈ TRAIN ∧ head(t) 6= rear(t)}
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An important invariant captures requirement SAF 1, stating that for any
two distinct trains t1, t2, they do not occupy the same section.
∀t1, t2 ·t1 ∈ dom(trains) ∧ t2 ∈ dom(trains) ∧ t1 6= t2 ⇒
area(trains(t1)) ∩ area(trains(t2)) = ∅
The invariant leads to the following additional guard for enter and extend head
∀t1 ·t1 ∈ dom(trains) ⇒ s /∈ area(trains(t1))
While proving the correctness of our model, we discovered the following re-
quired constraints on the train abstract data type. These constraints are for-
malised by additional axioms over the abstract data type’s operations.
area add head : ∀t , s ·t 7→ s ∈ dom(add head) ⇒
area(add head(t 7→ s)) = area(t) ∪ {s}
area front : ∀t ·t ∈ dom(front) ⇒ area(front(t)) = area(t) \ {rear(t)}
area new train : ∀s ·s ∈ SECTION ⇒ area(new train(s)) = {s}
In order to specify the fact that the trains do not derail, SAF 2, we introduce
another operation, connection, on the train abstract data type to specify the
connections of the sections belonging to a train. The typing information for
connection is as follows.
connection Type : connection ∈ TRAIN → (SECTION ↔ SECTION )
The invariant corresponding to SAF 2 is
∀t ·t ∈ dom(trains) ⇒ connection(trains(t)) ⊆ NETWORK ,
where NETWORK is a constant describing the topology of the actual network.
An additional guard is added to event extend head as follows.
s 7→ head(trains(t)) ∈ NETWORK
Again, we discovered additional constraints on the operation connection while
proving the model.
connection add head : ∀t , s ·t 7→ s ∈ dom(add head) ⇒
connection(add head(t 7→ s)) = connection(t) ∪ {s 7→ head(t)}
connection front : ∀t ·t ∈ dom(front) ⇒ connection(front(t)) ⊆ connection(t)
connection new train : ∀s ·s ∈ SECTION ⇒ connection(new train(s)) = ∅
Note that axiom connection front does not specify exactly how a train’s connec-
tion is changed when the rear is removed. It only specifies that the connection
will not be enlarged. This suffices for proving the no-derailment property of the
system.
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Generic Instantiation We now need to find a representation for the train
data type. This is the point where the role of the formal method expert becomes
prominent. As mentioned before, different data structures can be used to rep-
resent the train abstract data type. We present here a solution where a train is
represented by a function from an integer interval to the set of sections. Each
train is associated with a tuple (a, b, f), where the interval a .. b represents the
domain of a total injective function f .
train Def : TRAIN = {a 7→ b 7→ f | a ∈ Z ∧ a ≤ b ∧ f ∈ a .. b SECTION }
The train’s head is located at the lower end of the interval (a) and its rear
at the upper end (b). Injectivity guarantees that the sequence cannot include a
section twice at different positions. The operations on the train data type are
defined accordingly.
head Def : head = {a, b, f · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN | (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ f(a)}
rear Def : rear = {a, b, f · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN | (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ f(b)}
area Def : area = {a, b, f · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN | (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ f [a .. b]}
add head Def : add head = {a, b, f, s · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN ∧ s /∈ t[a .. b]
| (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ s 7→ ((a− 1) 7→ b 7→ (f ∪ {a− 1 7→ s}))}
front Def : front = {a, b, f · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN ∧ a 6= b
| (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ (a 7→ (b− 1) 7→ ({b}C− f))}
new train Def : new train = {s · s ∈ SECTION | s 7→ (1 7→ 1 7→ {1 7→ s})}
connection Def : connection = {a, b, f · a 7→ b 7→ f ∈ TRAIN
| (a 7→ b 7→ f) 7→ {i · i ∈ a .. b− 1 | t(i) 7→ t(i + 1)}}
By instantiating the abstract type TRAIN TYPE to Z×Z×P(Z×SECTION )
and other abstract constants with the concrete constants of the same name, we
can prove that the constraints of the train abstract data type (abstract axioms)
are derivable from the definition of the train data type.
For instantiating the train abstract data type, we used the prototype plug-in
for generic instantiation.
5 Related Work
Generic instantiation in Event-B has been introduced in [3] and is further elab-
orated in [8]. Both papers illustrate the use of generic instantiation for reusing
formal models by combining it with existing techniques like refinement and com-
position. In this paper, we illustrate another application of generic instantiation
for algebraically modelling abstract data types. In particular, the abstract de-
velopment and the concrete instantiated development enable the separation of
concerns between domain experts and formal methods experts. The domain ex-
perts can work with the abstract models, stating the assumptions under which
the systems work correctly. The formal method experts use generic instantiation
to prove that the actual implementations satisfy the assumptions as required by
the domain experts.
A similar form of generic instantiation is also available in classical B[2]. A de-
velopment in classical B also contains abstract data which must be finalised when
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the final software products are deployed. This finalisation process is an instan-
tiation step, involving validating that the actual data satisfies the assumptions
stated in the formal model [5]. We illustrate here (together with other work [3,8])
that generic instantiation is also useful during the stepwise development of the
formal models, not just as the last realisation step in deploying the formal mod-
els.
Recent development of the Theory Plug-in [6] allows users to extend the
mathematical languages of Event-B, e.g., by including new data types. Theo-
rems about new data types can be stated and used later by a dedicated tactic
associated with the Theory Plug-in. There is also a clear distinction between the
theory modules (capturing data structures and their properties) and the Event-
B models making use of the newly defined data structures. This distinction also
enables a collaboration between domain experts and formal methods experts:
the domain experts work with the Event-B models while the formal methods
experts work with the theory modules. The difference with our approach is the
order in which the work is carried out. With the Theory Plug-in, the domain
experts rely on the theory developed by the formal methods experts. In our ap-
proach, the input for the formal methods experts are the abstract models that
are developed by the domain experts, including the assumptions stated as ax-
ioms on the abstract carrier sets and constants. Another difference is that we
can have different implementations for the abstract data types.
Our approach is similar to work on algebraic specification [7]. In this domain,
a specification contains a collection of sorts, operations, and axioms constraining
the operations. Specifications can be enriched by additional sorts, operations,
or axioms. Furthermore, to develop programs from specifications, the specifi-
cations are transformed via a sequence of small refinement steps. During these
steps, the operations are “coded” until the specification becomes a concrete de-
scription of a program. For each such refinement step, it is required to prove that
the code of the operations satisfy the axioms constraining them. An algebraic
specification therefore corresponds to an Event-B context, while the refinement
of the algebraic specifications is similar to generic instantiation in Event-B. The
main difference between algebraic specification and Event-B is that there is no
corresponding elements to Event-B machines. In particular, we make use of the
dynamic information of Event-B machines to derive the necessary axioms on the
abstract data types.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented our approach to modeling abstract data types and
their implementation in Event-B. Using abstract data types allows us to hide
irrelevant details that are not important for the domain expert. The domain
expert can focus on modelling the functionality of the system which is his core
competence. Abstract data types thereby have a similar purpose to programming
interfaces in programming languages. The instantiation of the abstract data type
is left to an Event-B expert. The way we introduced the concept of abstract data
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types in our approach allows us to utilise generic instantiation which handles
both the substitution of the abstract data type by the chosen data structure
as well as the generation of the needed proof obligations to guarantee that the
chosen structure is a valid instance of the abstract data type.
We successfully applied our approach to the example in this paper as well as
a substantially more complex version of it. Further investigation is needed on the
scalability of the approach, which is essential for its applicability in industrial
development processes. Furthermore, we are interested in applying our approach
outside the domain of railway systems to obtain evidence for its generality.
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Abstract. Designing fault tolerance mechanisms for multi-agent sys-
tems is a notoriously difficult task. In this paper we present an approach
to formal development of a fault tolerant multi-agent system by refine-
ment in Event-B. We demonstrate how to formally specify cooperative
error recovery and dynamic reconfiguration in Event-B. Moreover, we
discuss how to express and verify essential properties of a fault tolerant
multi-agent system while refining it. The approach is illustrated by a
case study – a multi-robotic system.
Keywords: Event-B, formal modelling, refinement, fault tolerance, multi-
agent system
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MAS) and in particular the agent cooperation have been
a subject of an active research over the last decade. In this paper we focus on
studying the fault tolerance aspects of agent cooperation. Namely, we discuss
how to express and verify essential properties of a fault tolerant MAS. More-
over, we show by example how to formally derive a specification of a MAS that
relies on dynamic reconfiguration and cooperative error recovery to achieve fault
tolerance.
In this paper, we present a formal development of a cleaning multi-robotic
system. The system has a heterogenous architecture consisting of several sta-
tionary devices, base stations, that coordinate the work of respective groups of
robots. Since both base stations and robots can fail, the main objective of our
formal development is to formally specify cooperative error recovery and verify
that the proposed design ensures goal reachability. The proposed development
approach ensures goal reachability “by construction”. It is based on refinement
in Event-B [1] – a formal top-down approach to correct-by-construction system
development. In this paper we demonstrate how to formally define a system
goal and, in a stepwise manner, derive a detailed specification of the system
architecture.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly overview the Event-
B formalism. In Section 3 we define the main principles of formal reasoning
Kyoto 17 November 13, 2012
about goal-oriented MAS, describe the requirements for our case study – a multi-
robotic system – and outline the development strategy. Section 4 presents a
formal development of the system and demonstrates how to express and verify
its properties during the refinement process. Finally, in Section 5 we overview
the related work and discuss the achieved results.
2 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the
correct-by-construction development paradigm and formal verification by the-
orem proving [1]. In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of
an abstract state machine. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model
state represented as a collection of variables, and defines operations on this
state, i.e., it describes the behaviour of the modelled system. A machine may
have the accompanying component, called context. A context may include user-
defined carrier sets, constants and their properties (model axioms). In Event-B,
the model variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates called in-
variants. Moreover, the invariants specify important properties that should be
preserved during the system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the set of atomic events.
Generally, an event can be defined as
evt b= any vl where g then S end
where vl is a list of new local variables, g is the guard, and S is the action. The
guard is a state predicate that defines the conditions under which the action
can be executed. In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of
deterministic or non-deterministic assignments.
The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce implementa-
tion details, while preserving functional correctness. The consistency of Event-B
models, i.e., invariant preservation, correctness of refinement steps, should be
formally demonstrated by discharging relevant proof obligations. The verifica-
tion efforts, in particular, automatic generation and proving of the required
proof obligations, are significantly facilitated by the Rodin platform [10]. Proof-
based verification as well as reliance on abstraction and decomposition adopted
in Event-B offers the designers a scalable support for the development of such
complex distributed systems as MAS.
3 Multi-Agent Systems
Our paper focuses on formal modelling and development of MAS that should
function autonomously, i.e., without human intervention. Typically, the main
task or goal that such a MAS should accomplish is split between the deployed
agents. Since agents may fail, to ensure success of the overall goal, we should in-
corporate some fault tolerance mechanisms into the system design. These mech-
anisms rely on cooperative error recovery that allows the system dynamically
reallocate functions from the failed agents to the healthy ones. A large number
of failure modes and scenarios makes verification of goal reachability in the pres-
ence of cooperative error recovery quite difficult and time-consuming. Therefore,
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there is a clear need for rigorous approaches that support scalable design and
verification in a systematic manner.
3.1 Towards a Formalisation of a Goal-Oriented MAS
Let us now describe more formally the properties that a MAS is expected to
satisfy.
1. Let us to denote the system state space as Σ. Then the main goal G that
the system aims at accomplishing can be associated with a specific predicate
over Σ:
G : Σ → BOOL.
In other words, the system goal is reached in a particular state σ if and only
if G(σ) = TRUE.
2. The system goal G can usually be decomposed into a set of subgoals SGi,
where i ∈ 1..n. We suppose that there exists a precise relationships, Expr,
between reachability of the main goal and that of the subgoals such that:
G(σ) = TRUE ⇔ Expr(SG1(σ), ..., SGn(σ)) = TRUE.
3. We assume that the system is stable with respect to its goals (subgoals), i.e.,
once a particular goal (subgoal) is reached, it stays reached. In B models,
this property can be formulated as an invariant (using auxiliary variables to
refer to the relevant part of the previous system state σprev) of the form:
G(σprev) = TRUE ⇒ G(σ) = TRUE.
4. In multi-agent systems, (sub)goals are usually achieved by system agents.
Often a specific (sub)goal should be accomplished only by a particular subset
of agents. We call such agents eligible. Formally, for each subgoal SGi, we
define a eligibility function, SGi Elig:
SGi Elig : AGENTS×Σ → BOOL,
where AGENTS denotes a set of all the system agents. In practice, such a
function often checks whether a particular agent belongs to a specific class
of agents responsible for achieving the subgoal. Moreover, it also determines
whether the agent is able to perform the required task, i.e., it has not failed.
5. Since MAS are distributed, we assume that the knowledge about the (sub)goal
reachability is shared among the agents. In other words, each agent has its
own local copy of it. We model this by a family of functions Agent SGi,
where i ∈ 1..n:
Agent SGi : AGENTS ×Σ → BOOL.
The local and global knowledge must be consistent, i.e.,
SGi(σ) = FALSE ⇒ ∀a ∈ AGENTS.Agent SGi(a, σ) = FALSE. (1)
In practice, it means that the information about reaching a particular sub-
goal by an agent should be broadcasted to the other agents.
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6. The essential property of the considered MAS is eventual reachability of its
main goal. In B models, such reachability is typically abstractly modelled by
a single event reaching the desired system state. The event is then refined by
the group of events terminating in the desired state. To prove termination,
the natural number expression, variant, should be defined and shown to
be decreased by the refined events. We assume that there exists a variant
expression Vi, Vi ∈ Σ → NAT, for each subgoal SGi of the system.
Since system agents may fail before reaching the assigned (sub)goal, to prove
eventual goal reachability, we need to introduce various agent cooperative
recovery scenarios that allow the active agents to take over the failed ones.
We will consider several such scenarios later in this paper.
To exemplify a goal-oriented development of MAS, next we present our case
study – a multi-robotic system. We start by informally defining the system re-
quirements. Then we demonstrate how to formally develop such a system in
Event-B and prove its essential properties.
3.2 A Case Study: A Multi-Robotic System
The goal of the multi-robotic system is to get a certain territory cleaned by
the robots. The territory is divided into several zones, which in turn are further
divided into a number of sectors. Each zone has a base station that coordinates
the cleaning activities within the zone. In general, one base station might coor-
dinate several zones. In its turn, each base station supervises a number of robots
attached to it by assigning cleaning tasks to them.
A robot is an autonomous electro-mechanical device that can move and clean.
A base station may assign a robot a specific sector to clean. Upon receiving the
task, the robot autonomously moves to this sector and performs cleaning. After
successfully completing its mission, the robot returns back to the base station to
receive a new task. The base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned
sectors. Moreover, the base stations periodically exchange the information about
their cleaned sectors.
While performing the given assignment, a robot may fail. Subsequently it
leads to a failure to clean the assigned sector. We assume that a base station is
able to detect all the failed robots attached to it. In case of a robot failure, the
base station may assign another active robot to perform the failed task.
A base station might fail as well. We assume that a failure of a base station
can be detected by the others stations. In that case, the healthy base stations
redistribute control over the zones and robots coordinated by the failed station.
Let us now formulate the main requirements and properties associated with
the multi-robotic system that is informally described above.
(PR1) The main system goal: the whole territory has to be cleaned.
(PR2) To clean the territory, every its zone has to be cleaned.
(PR3) To clean a zone, every its sector has to be cleaned.
(PR4) Every cleaned sector (zone) remains cleaned during the system execution.
(PR5) No two robots should clean the same sector. In other words, a robot gets
only non-assigned and non-cleaned sectors to clean.
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(PR6) The information about the cleaned sectors stored in any base station has
to be consistent with the current state of the territory. More specifically, if a
base station considers a particular sector in some zone to be cleaned, then
this sector is marked as cleaned in the memory of the base station responsible
for it. Also, if a sector is marked as non-cleaned in the memory of the base
station responsible for it, then any base station sees it as non-cleaned.
(PR7) Base station cooperation: if a base station has been detected as failed then
some base station will take the responsibility for all the zones and robots of
the failed base station.
(PR8) Base station cooperation: if a base station has no more active robots, a
group of robot is sent to this base station from another base station.
(PR9) Base station cooperation: if a base station has cleaned all its zones, its
active robots may be reallocated under control of another base station.
The last three requirements essentially describe the cooperative recovery
mechanisms that we assume to be present in the described multi-robot system.
3.3 Formal Development Strategy
In the next section we will present a formal Event-B development of the described
multi-system robotic system. We demonstrate how to specify and verify the given
properties (PR1)–(PR9). Let us now give a short overview of this development
and highlight formal techniques used to ensure the proposed properties.
We start with a very abstract model, essentially representing the system be-
haviour as a process iteratively trying to achieve the main goal (PR1). The next
couple of data refinement steps decompose the main goal into a set of subgoals,
i.e., reformulate it in terms of zones and sectors. We will define the gluing in-
variants establishing a formal relationship between goals and the corresponding
subgoals. Thus, we will define a relation Expr, described in Section 3.1.
While the specification remains highly abstract, we postpone the proof of goal
reachability property by defining the corresponding events as anticipated. Once,
as a result of the refinement process, the model becomes sufficiently detailed,
we change the event statuses into convergent and prove their termination. To
achieve this, we need to define a variant – a natural number expression – and
show that the execution of any of these events decreases it.
Next we introduce the agent types – base stations and robots. The base sta-
tions coordinate execution of the tasks required to achieve the corresponding
subgoal, while the robots execute the tasks allocated to them. We formally de-
fine the relationships between different types of agents, as well as agents and
respective subgoals. These relationships are specified and proved as invariant
properties of the model.
The consequent refinement steps explicitly introduce agent failures, the in-
formation exchange as well as cooperation activities between the agents. The
integrity between the local and the global information stored within base sta-
tions is again formulated and proved as model invariant properties.
We assume that communication between the base stations as well as the
robots and the base stations is reliable. In other words, messages are always
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transmitted correctly without any loss or errors. The main focus of our develop-
ment is on specifying and verifying the cooperative recovery mechanisms.
4 Development of a Multi-Robotic System in Event-B
4.1 Modelling system goals and subgoals
Abstract model. Our initial model abstractly represents the behaviour of the
described multi-robotic system. We aim at ensuring the property (PR1). We
define a variable goal ∈ STATE that models the current state of the system
goal, where STATE = {incompl, compl}. In the process of achieving the goal,
modeled by the event Body, the variable goal may eventually change its value
from incompl to compl. The value compl corresponds to the situation when the
goal is achieved, i.e., the whole territory is cleaned. The system continues its
execution until the whole territory is not cleaned, i.e., while goal stays incompl.
Body b= status anticipated
when goal 6= compl then goal :∈ STATE end
First refinement. In our first refinement step we elaborate on the process of
cleaning the territory. Specifically, we assume that the whole territory is divided
into n zones, where n ∈ N and n ≥ 1, and aim at ensuring the property (PR2). We
augment our model with a representation of subgoals. We associate the notion
of a subgoal with the process of cleaning a particular zone. A subgoal is achieved
only when the corresponding zone is cleaned. A new variable zones represents
the current subgoal status for every zone: zones ∈ 1..n→ STATE.
To establish the relationship between goal and subgoals and formalise the
property (PR2) per se, we formulate the gluing invariant:
goal = compl⇔ zones[1..n] = {compl}.
The invariant can be understood as follows: the territory is considered to be
cleaned if and only if its every zone is cleaned. In this case, the Expr, defined
in the Section 3, becomes a conjunction of the subgoals. To model cleaning of
a zone(s), we refined the abstract event Body. We model it in such a way that,
while a certain subgoal is reached, it stays reached. Hence we ensure the property
(PR4).
Second refinement. Next we further decompose system subgoals into a set
of subsubgoals. We assume that each zone in our system is divided into k sec-
tors, where k ∈ N and k ≥ 1, and aim at formalising the property (PR3). We
establish the relationship between the notion of a subsubgoal (or simply a task)
and the process of cleaning a particular sector. A task is completed when the
corresponding sector is cleaned. A new variable territory represents the current
status of each sector:
territory ∈ 1 .. n→ (1 .. k→ STATE).
The following gluing invariant expresses the relationship between subgoals and
subsubgoals (tasks) and correspondingly ensures the property (PR3):
∀j ·j ∈ 1 .. n⇒ (zones(j) = compl⇔ territory(j)[1 .. k] = {compl}).
The invariant says that a zone is cleaned if and only if each of its sectors is
cleaned.
The refined event Body is now models cleaning of a previously non-cleaned
sector:
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Body b= refines Body status anticipated
any z, s, result
when z ∈ 1..n∧s ∈ 1 .. k∧ territory(z)(s) 6= compl ∧result ∈ STATE
then territory(z) := territory(z)− {s 7→ result} end
Let us observe that the event Body also preserves the property (PR4).
4.2 Introducing Agents
In the third refinement step we augment our model with a representation of
agents. In the model context, we define the abstract finite set AGENTS and its
disjointed non-empty subsets RB and BS that represent the robots and the base
stations respectively. To define a relationship between a zone and its supervising
base station, we introduce the variable responsible:
responsible ∈ 1 .. n→BS.
Each active robot is supervised by a certain base station. We model this
relationship between robots and their supervised station by a variable attached,
defined as a partial function:
attached ∈ RB 7→BS.
To coordinate the cleaning process, a base station stores the information
about its own cleaned sectors and updates the information about the status of
the other cleaned sectors. We assume that each base station has a “map” – the
knowledge about all sectors of the whole territory. To model this, we introduce
a new variable local map:
local map ∈ BS→ (1 .. n 7→ (1 .. k→ STATE)).
The abstract variable territory represents the global knowledge on the whole
territory. For any sector and zone, this global knowledge has to be consistent
with the information stored by the base stations. In particular, if in the local
knowledge of any base station a sector is marked as cleaned, then it should be
cleaned according to the global knowledge as well. To establish those relation-
ships, we formulate and prove the following invariant:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇒ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
For each base station, the local information about its zones and sectors always
coincides with the global knowledge about the corresponding zones and sectors:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇔ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
All together, these three invariants formalise the property (PR6). It easy to see
that these invariants are special cases of the property (1), formulated in the
Section 3.
A base station assigns a cleaning task to its attached robots. Here, we have
to ensure the property (PR5) – no two robots can clean the certain sector at the
same time. We introduce a number of new variables and an event NewTask to
model this behaviour.
The robot failures have some impact on execution of the cleaning process. The
task cannot be performed if the robot assigned for it has failed. To reflect this
behaviour, we refine the event Body by two events TaskSuccess and TaskFailure,
which respectively model successful and unsuccessful execution of the task.
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TaskSuccess b= refines Body status convergent
any bs, rb, z, s
when bs ∈ BS ∧ rb ∈ dom(attached) ∧ attached(rb) = bs ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs∧
asgn z(rb) = z ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ asgn s(rb) = s ∧ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl
then territory(z) := territory(z)− {s 7→ compl} ‖
asgn s(rb) := 0 ‖ asgn z(rb) := 0 ‖ counter := counter − 1 ‖
local map(bs) := local map(bs)− {z 7→ local map(bs)(z)− {s 7→ compl}} end
At this refinement step, we are ready to demonstrate that the events
TaskSuccess and TaskFailure converge. To prove it, we define the variant ex-
pression over system variables, counter + card(dom(attached)), and prove that
it is decreased by new events. An auxiliary variable counter stores the number
of all non-cleaned sectors of the whole territory, see [8] for details.
A base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned sectors and repeat-
edly receives the information from the other base stations about their cleaned
sectors. The knowledge is inaccurate for the period when the information is sent
but not yet received. In this refinement step, we abstractly model receiving the
information by a base station. We introduce a new event UpdateMap to model
updating of the local map of a base station.
In this refinement step we also introduce an abstract representation of the
base station cooperation defined by the property (PR7). Namely, we allow to
reassign a group of robots from one base station to another. We define such a
behaviour in the event ReassignRB. In the next refinement steps we will elaborate
on this event and define the conditions under which this behaviour takes place.
Additionally, we model a possible redistribution between the base stations
their pre-assigned responsibility for zones and robots. This behaviour is defined
in the new event GetAdditionalResponsibility presented below. The guard of the
event defines the conditions when such a change is allowed. A base station can
take the responsibility for a set of new zones if it has the accurate knowledge
about these zones, i.e., the information about their cleaned and non-cleaned
sectors.
GetAdditionalResponsibility b=
any bs i, bs j, rbs, zs
when bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ zs ⊂ 1 .. n ∧ zs = dom(responsible {bs i}) ∧ bs i 6= bs j ∧
rbs ⊂ dom(attached) ∧ rbs = dom(attached {bs i}) ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
(∀z, s·z ∈ zs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs j)(z)(s))
then responsible := responsible− (zs× {bs j}) ‖ attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j}) ‖
local map(bs i) := ∅ ‖ asgn z := asgn z− (rbs×{0}) ‖ asgn s := asgn s− (rbs×{0})
end
Modelling this behaviour allows us to formalise the property (PR9).
4.3 Modelling of Broadcasting
In next, fourth refinement step we aim at defining an abstract model of broad-
casting. After receiving a notification from a robot about successful cleaning the
assigned sector, a base station updates its local map and broadcasts the message
about the cleaned sector to the other base stations. In its turn, upon receiving
the message, each base station correspondingly updates its own local map. A
new relational variable msg models the message broadcasting buffer:
msg ∈ BS↔ (1 .. n× 1 .. k).
Kyoto 24 November 13, 2012
If a message (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) belongs to this buffer then the sector s from the zone
z has been cleaned. The first element of the message, bs, determines to which
base station the message is sent. If there are no messages in the msg buffer for
any particular base station then the local map of this base station is accurate,
i.e., it coincides with the global knowledge about the territory:
∀bs, z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) /∈ msg⇒
territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s),
∀bs·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs /∈ dom(msg)⇒
(∀z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s)).
After receiving a notification about successful cleaning of a sector, a base
station marks this sector as cleaned in its local map and then broadcasts the
message about it to other base stations. To model this, we refine the abstract
events TaskSuccess and UpdateMap.
4.4 Introducing Robot and Base Station Failures
Fifth refinement. Now we aim at modelling possible robot failures. We elab-
orate on the abstract events concerning robot and zone reassigning. We start by
partitioning the robots into active and failed ones. The current set of all active
robots is defined by a new variable active. Initially all robots are active, i.e.,
active = RB. A new event RobotFailure models possible robot failures that can
happen at any time during system execution. We make an assumption that the
last active robot can not fail and add the corresponding guard card(active) > 1
to the event RobotFailure to restrict possible robot failures. In practice, the con-
straint to have at least one operational agent associated with our model can
be validated by probabilistic modelling of goal reachability, which is planned
as a future work. Let us also note that for multi-robotic systems with many
homogeneous agents this constraint is usually satisfied.
A base station monitors all its robots and detects the failed ones. The abstract
event TaskFailure abstractly models such robot detection.
To formalise the property (PR8), we should model a situation when some
base station does not have active robots anymore. In that case, some group
of active robots has to be sent to this base station from another base station.
This behaviour is modelled by the event ReassignNewBStoRBs that refines the
abstract event ReassignRB:
ReassignNewBStoRBs b= refines ReassignRB
any bs i, bs j, rbs
when bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ rbs ⊂ active ∧ ran(rbs attached) = {bs} ∧ rbs 6= ∅ ∧
ran(rbs asgn s) = {0} ∧ bs i ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs i ∈ ran(rbs− attached) ∧ dom(attached {bs j}) * active
then attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j}) end
This event can be further refined by a concrete procedure to choose a particular
base station that will share its robots (e.g., based on load balancing).
Moreover, to ensure the property (PR9), we consider the situation when all
the sectors for which a base station is responsible are cleaned. In that case, all
the active robots of the base station may be sent to some other base station that
still has some unfinished cleaning to co-ordinate. This functionality is specified
by the event SendRobotsToBS (a refinement of the event ReassignRB).
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Sixth refinement. In the final refinement step presented in the paper, we
aim at specifying the base station failures. Each base station might be either
operating or failed. We introduce a new variable operating ⊆ BS to define the set
of all operating base stations. We also introduce a new event BaseStationFailure
to model a possible base station failure. We again make an assumption that the
last active base station can not fail.
In the fourth refinement step we modelled by the event
GetAdditionalResponsibility that a base station can take over the responsibility
for the robots and zones of another base station. Now we can refine this event by
introducing an additional condition – only if a base station is detected as failed,
another base station can take over its responsibility for the respective zones and
robots:
GetAdditionalResponsibility b= refines GetAdditionalResponsibility
any bs i, bs j, za, rbs
when bs i ∈ BS∧bs j ∈ operating∧zs ⊂ 1..n ∧zs = dom(responsible{bs i}) ∧bs i 6= bs j ∧
rbs ⊂ active ∧ rbs = dom(attached {bs i}) ∧ bs j /∈ dom(msg) ∧ bs i /∈ operating
then responsible := responsible− (zs× {bs j}) ‖ attached := attached− (rbs× {bs j}) ‖
asgn s := asgn s− (rbs×{0}) ‖ asgn z := asgn z− (rbs×{0}) ‖ local map(bs i) := ∅
end
As a result of the presented refinement chain, we arrived at a centralised model
of the multi-robotic system. We can further refine the system to derive its dis-
tributed implementation, relying on the modularisation extension of Event-B to
achieve this.
To verify correctness of the models we discharged more than 230 proof obli-
gations. Around 80% of them have been proved automatically by the Rodin
platform and the rest have been proved manually in the Rodin interactive prov-
ing environment.
5 Conclusions and Related Work
Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken in [12, 11]. The authors have
proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define such concepts
as mobility and context-awareness. Our modelling have pursued a different goal
– we have aimed at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour
achieves the pre-defined goals.
Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-B has been also undertaken
by Ball and Butler [2]. They have proposed a number of informally described pat-
terns that allow the designers to incorporate well-known (static) fault tolerance
mechanisms into formal models. In our approach, we have implemented a more
advanced fault tolerance scheme that relies on goal reallocation and dynamic
reconfiguration to guarantee goal reachability.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by van
Lamsweerde [5]. The original motivation behind the goal-oriented development
was to structure the system requirements and derive properties in the form
of temporal logic formulas. Over the last decade, the goal-oriented approach
has received several extensions that allow the designers to link it with formal
modelling [6, 7, 9]. These works aimed at expressing temporal logic properties
in Event-B. In our work, we have relied on goals to facilitate structuring of the
system behaviour and derived a detailed system model that satisfies the desired
properties by refinement.
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The theoretical aspects of modelling reachability has been studied in [3]. A
work similar to our but in the context of discovering a distributed topology is
presented in [4]. In our work, reasoning about liveness property has been put
in the context of goal-oriented development.
In this paper we have presented an approach to formal development of a
fault tolerant MAS with cooperative error recovery by refinement in Event-B.
The formal development has allowed us to uncover missing requirements and
rigorously define the relationships between agents. It has also facilitated a sys-
tematic derivation of a complex mechanism for cooperative error recovery.
Our approach has demonstrated a number of advantages comparing to vari-
ous process-algebraic approaches used for modelling MAS. We relied on a proof-
based verification that allowed us to derive a quite complex model of the be-
haviour of a multi-agent robotic system. We did not need to impose restrictions
on the size of the model, number of agents etc. We could comfortably express
intricate relationships between the system goals and the employed agents. There-
fore, we believe that Event-B and the associated tool set will provide a suitable
framework for formal modelling of complex MAS.
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Abstract. The RODIN, and DEPLOY projects laid solid foundations
for further theoretical, and practical (methodological and tooling) ad-
vances with Event-B. Our current interest is the co-simulation of cyber-
physical systems using Event-B. Using this approach we aim to simulate
various features of the environment separately, in order to exercise de-
ployable code. This paper has two contributions, the first is the extension
of the code generation work of DEPLOY, where we add the ability to gen-
erate code from Event-B state-machine diagrams. The second describes
how we may use code, generated from state-machines, to simulate the
environment, and simulate concurrently executing state-machines, in a
single task. We show how we can instrument the code to guide the simu-
lation, by controlling the relative rate that non-deterministic transitions
are traversed in the simulation.
1 Introduction
This paper describes activities undertaken during the early part of the AD-
VANCE [8] project. Building on the RODIN, and DEPLOY projects [9], we are
working to better understand the issues arising in a development when modelling
with Event-B, and animating with ProB, in tandem with a multi-simulation
strategy. Some of DEPLOY’s industrial partners were interested in the formal
development of multi-tasking, embedded control systems. We developed an ap-
proach for automatically generating code from Event-B models, for these types
of systems [3]. In this paper we also present an extension to this work.
Event-B uses set-theory, predicate logic and refinement to model discrete
systems. The basic structural elements of Event-B models are contexts and ma-
chines. Contexts describe the static aspects of a system, using sets, constants,
and axioms. The contents of a Context can be made visible to a machine. Ma-
chines describe the dynamic aspects of a system, in the form of state variables,
and guarded events, which update state. Required properties are specified using
the invariants clause. The invariants give rise to proof obligations.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the Event-B representation of
state-machines, and Tasking Event-B, our existing code-generation approach.
We introduce a case study in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the new code
generation feature for Event-B state-machine diagrams. In Section 4 we describe
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Fig. 1. EngMode State-machine
how we use a single task, generated from state-machines, to simulate the envi-
ronment and concurrently executing state-machines. We show how we guide the
simulation, using additional guards on the transition implementations, to control
the relative rate that non-deterministic transitions are traversed. We conclude
with Section 5.
State-machine diagrams [1] can be added to a machine. Each contains an
initial state, typically contains one or more transitions, one or more other states,
and possibly a final state. A transition ’elaborates’ one or more events; that is, a
transition describes the atomic state updates that occur during the change from
one state to the next. We use an example of an automotive engine stop-start
controller, loosely based on [5], to illustrate our approach. The system aims to
save fuel by switching the engine off when the car is stationary. Fig. 1 is an
example of a state-machine diagram, EngMode. Initially the state-machine is in
the ENG OFF state, and may go the ENG CRANKING state via transitions
s1 or userStart, and so on. In the properties we define ‘translation type’ as
Enumeration. The underlying Event-B model, uses a set-partition of the states,
as shown below. The current state of the state-machine is recorded in a variable
EngMode ∈ EngMode STATES, where EngMode STATES is a partition of
the states of the EngMode state-machine,
partition(EngMode STATES , {ENG STOPPING},
{ENG CRANKING}, {ENG RUNNING}, {ENG OFF}) (1)
1.1 Tasking Event-B
Tasking Event-B [3,4] is an extension to Event-B; where Event-B elements are
restricted to implementable types. If required we use decomposition [6,7] to sep-
arate the system into sub-components. At an appropriate stage we introduce
implementation specific constructs to guide code generation. These constructs
are underpinned by Event-B operational semantics; Tasking Event-B introduces
three main constructs:- AutoTask, Environ, and Shared Machines. AutoTask Ma-
chines model controller tasks (in the implementation). Environ Machines model
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the environment, and Shared Machines provide a protected resource for sharing
data between tasks.
Tasks bodies are specified using the syntax shown in Fig. 2. We can use (;)
sequence , (if-elsif-else) branching, (do) looping, and text output to the console.
TaskBody ::=  TaskBody ; TaskBody  | if EventName    (elseif EventName)*     else EventName  | while EventName  | output String VariableName
     else EventName  | while EventName  | output String VariableName
EventName ::= String
VariableName ::= String
Fig. 2. Task Body Syntax
1.2 Translation of a Task Body
To simplify the discussion, our example uses a single tasking approach. We will
not consider here the issue of multi-tasking. We therefore need only to give a brief
overview of AutoTask Machine translation, since it will not be synchronized with
a Shared Machine. Given an event E , g → a, we map action a to a program
statement a′, and guard g to a condition g′, if g exists. The guard should be >
for events used in sequences, but may be any implementable predicate for use in
branching and looping statements. An example translation of branching follows,
where events e1 , g1→ a1 and e2 , g2 → a2, are used in the task body,
if e1 else e2 endif
 
if g′1 then a
′
1 else a
′
2 end if;
The branching construct of the task body contains events e1 and e2, and trans-
lates to a branching construct in the program code. The guard g′2 does not
appear in the code, but to ensure that the modellers intentions are correctly
implemented a proof obligation can be generated to ensure that g2⇔¬g1. The
tool could be augmented to generate proof obligations automatically, to show
that branch guards are disjoint and complete.
2 The Automotive Stop-Start Model
A typical approach to multi-tasking in hybrid systems, relies on a write-read-
process protocol. The shared variable store, shown in Fig. 3, is used by the
various modules; to write to, and then read from. In such a system, each task
keeps a local copy of the parts of the state that it needs to deal with. In the
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write-read-process protocol, all tasks write to the store, all tasks then read from
the store. Only when all tasks have updated their local copies of shared state,
can processing take place. The task iterates these steps in a loop. In our tool we
simulate the concurrent implementation using sequential code generated from a
single AutoTask Machine. The deployable modules of Fig. 3 can be implemented
in a multi-tasking environment if the execution order of the protocol is preserved.
In our sequential simulation, we use a single AutoTask Machine, which con-
tains both controller and environment state-machines; and define write and read
behaviour in the machine’s task-body construct. We have already seen the Stop-
Start (SSE ) system’s EngMode state-machine, in Fig. 1. In addition to this we
have Clutch, Gear and Steering environment state-machines. There are three
controller modules, the SSE Module that decides whether to issue stop or start
commands based on the engine state, and values determined by the HMI Con-
trols module. HMI Controls monitors the clutch, gear, and steering controls to
see if automatic stop or start should be enabled.
Variable
Store
Engine
Mode
Controls
Module
Gears
Clutch
Steering
HMI
Controls
HMI
Display
SSE
MODULE
Write/Read
Write
Write/Read Read Write/Read
Environment
Simulation Deployable Modules
Fig. 3. Overview of the Stop-Start Architecture
2.1 The Task-body
We have defined the state-machines of the system and we can now specify the
IO between the modules via the shared variable store. The store contains a copy
of all of the variables involved in IO between modules. Each of the modules may
send data and receive data from the variable store. If we take, as an example, the
engine’s IO, we output the engine state and speed to the shared variable store.
All variables in the store are prefixed ‘STO ’, and variables in the engine module
(other than state names) are prefixed ‘ENG ’, so the following event updates the
shared variable store’s copies of the engine state. Each state-machine has a send
(write) and receive (read) event which has the state-machine name and send or
recv as a suffix.
Eng send , STO EngMode := EngMode
‖ STO EngineSpeed := ENG EngineSpeed
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2.2 Modelling Starting and Stopping the Engine
The EngMode state-machine keeps track of the engine mode, i.e. off, running,
cranking, or stopping. The engine is initially in the ENG OFF state. We model
the ultimate task of the SSE system, the automatic engine start, with the s1
event. This is enabled after receiving an engine start order from the Stop-
Start Controller module (the SSE Module’s SSEMode state-machine, introduced
later). The s1 event follows,
s1 , when EngMode = ENG OFF ∧ ENG Start Order = TRUE
then EngMode := ENG CRANKING
end
The predicate and action involving EngMode are generated automatically in the
translation from the state-machine diagram. The guard with ENG Start Order
is added by the developer to indicate that the engine should enter the cranking
state when a Start Order has been received. The engine may also be started
manually, as modelled by the userStart event. When the engine is running at a
sufficient rate s3 sets the engine state to ENG RUNNING,
s3 , when EngMode = ENG CRANKING
∧ Eng EngineSpeed >= Eng Idle Speed
then EngMode := ENG RUNNING
end
When the engine is running, it can be stopped automatically by the SSE module.
The HMI Controls module checks to see if it is in neutral gear, steering not-used,
and clutch released. If it is, HMI Stop EnaT sets HMI Stop Ena to true. This
is eventually passed to the SSEMode module via the shared store.
HMI Stop EnaT ,
when HMI Gear = NEUTRAL ∧HMI Steer = NOT USED
∧HMI Clutch = RELEASED ∧HMI ControlsSM = HMI OPERATION
then HMI Stop Ena := TRUE ‖HMI Strt Req := FALSE
end
Event t7 elaborates a transition of the SSE state-machine diagram, setting
SSE Stop Order and SSE Start Order. This is copied to the variable store,
and then read by the engine module.
t7 ,
when SSEMode = SSE OPERATION ∧ SSE Stop Req = TRUE
∧ SSE EngMode = ENG RUNNING ∧ SSE Stop Ena = TRUE
then SSEMode := SSE STOPPING ‖ SSE Stop Order := TRUE
‖ SSE Start Order := FALSE
end
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Fig. 4. The Task Body Specification
We specify the sequence of events in the Task Body in the ‘usual’ Tasking Event-
B style, seen in Fig. 4. We have specified that send events occur before the read
events. This is necessary to ensure the latest state is made available for the
state-machine evaluation. The Task Body is periodic, and generates a loop in the
implementation. The order of processing is as follows: 1) Initialisation of state. 2)
Evaluate state-machines. 3) Send updated values to the variable store. 4) Read
updated values from the variable store; then go to 2, and repeat. The sequence
{4,2,3}, in the task body, corresponds to the read-process-write protocol, which
follows initialisation (and initial sends to the variable store). Fig. 4 also shows the
output clause, for text output to the console. The next section provides details
of the translation to Ada code.
3 Translating State-Machines to Ada Code
To illustrate the translation process we show the Ada implementation, we have
seen how state-machine states are modelled by an enumeration partition, and
we use this in the implementation. The partition of Equation 1 is translated to
the following Ada code.
package StopStart01b Globals is
type EngMode STATES is(
ENG STOPPING , ENG CRANKING ,
ENG RUNNING , ENG OFF ); . . .
We create the package StopStart01b Globals to store the global constants and
types. The type EngMode STATES is an enumeration of the state-machine
states. Recall also, that we generate a state variable EngMode which is typed as
EngMode ∈ EngMode STATES, to keep track of the state; it has the initial
value Eng OFF. We use the diagram and the initialisation event to generate the
following code:
EngMode : EngMode STATES := ENG OFF ;
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The main program invokes the state-machine implementations in a loop, once
per cycle. Each state-machine diagram maps to a procedure. State-machine pro-
cedures are called exactly once before the sends to, and reads, from the variable
store. The evaluation of each state-machine procedure is independent of the
other state-machines, since each keeps a local copy of the state, copied from the
variable store. Each state-machine procedure has a state variable v, states wi,
and implemented actions ai. To each state-machine procedure, we add to a case
statement,
case v is when w1 => a1;
when w2 => a2; . . .
when wn => null;
Translation of our example gives rise to the following code,
procedure EngModestateMachine is
begin
case EngMode is
when ENG STOPPING =>
if ((ENG EngineSpeed = 0 )) then
EngMode := ENG OFF ; −− s5
elsif ((ENG Start Order = true)) then
EngMode := ENG CRANKING ; −− s6
else null;
end if;
when ENG CRANKING =>
if ((ENG EngineSpeed = 0 )) then
EngMode := ENG OFF ; −− s2
elsif ((ENG EngineSpeed >= Eng Idle Speed)) then
EngMode := ENG RUNNING ; −− s3
else null;
end if;
when ENG RUNNING => . . .
end case;
end EngModestateMachine;
We can see that each of the case’s when statements contains a branching state-
ment. This is because each state of the state-machine has at least two branches;
a do-nothing transition, plus one or more outgoing transitions. The do-nothing
transition is not explicitly shown on the diagram. A do-nothing transition can be
added to each state, since adding a skip event is a valid refinement. It is imple-
mented by the else null; branch. Other branches are translated from states with
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more than one outgoing transition. This may be seen in the ENG STOPPING
case in the example. The branch conditions are mapped from the guards of the
events (s5 and s6) that elaborate the outgoing transitions.
4 Manipulating State Machine Transitions
The generated code from our example is compiled to an executable file and run.
We have implementable code for the controller state-machines, and a simulation
of the environment from the environment state-machines. When executing, we
find that most of the state remains unexplored, and this is due to the non-
determinism in the state-machines. This section identifies how we can guide a
simulation, by reducing the non-determinism in the generated state-machine by
modifying the branch conditions.
For the controller state-machines, each state’s outgoing transitions are dis-
joint and complete; in other words, a transition is always taken in the simula-
tion. However, in the environment, it is unlikely that the clutch changes state so
frequently. We do have the implicit do-nothing transition on environment state-
machine states, but we need this to happen more often than the other transitions.
We must have some control over the relative rate that non-deterministic tran-
sitions are traversed in the simulation. As it stands, any outgoing transition is
equally likely to occur. To solve this in the simulation, we introduce an enabling
variable q ∈ 0 .. n and a random variable r ∈ 0 .. n, and use the random vari-
able in a case-statement’s branch conditions. Variable q is calculated once at the
beginning of the simulation, but a new random variable r is calculated at each
state-machine evaluation. The event g 7→ a in Event-B terms is implemented as
a branch g ∧ r = q 7→ a in a case-statement.
We now suggest how we may generate, and use the variables q and r in simu-
lation. This aspect is work in progress, but we believe the approach will be useful
for generating test scenarios, and therefore will help to improve test coverage.
By adding a guard to the branch condition we can influence the path taken
through the code during simulation. In effect, we reduce the non-determinism in
the state-machines, which allows us to guide the simulation, and therefore the
exploration of the state-space.
One question is, how to choose a value of n? We could base it on the total
number of outgoing transitions of the state involved, but this would not give a
large enough value. A typical state may have four transitions, plus a do-nothing
transition, so a random number r ∈ 0 .. 4 could be used. However, we wish to
manipulate the probability of a branch being taken, so that a branch is very
unlikely to be taken; therefore, a much larger value for n is required. So, we
calculate n based on the number of tests that would be required, for test coverage
of all transitions, in all states. Likewise, the value of q must be unique within
the case-statement; we just allocate an arbitrary, but unique value, close to n.
In future work we will investigate how we could modify n during simulation
runs, and use this value to reduce the probability of a simulation traversing
previously explored state. In the code fragment below, we add the probabilistic
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Fig. 5. Controlling the Simulation
condition to the branch of the case-statement, where r = StartStop01b random
(StartStop01b random is a random variable in the implementation code) and
q = 3990.
case EngMode is
when ENG STOPPING =>
if ((ENG EngineSpeed = 0 )) and (StopStart01b random = 3990 ) then
EngMode := ENG OFF ; . . .
Adding the branch condition gives us control over the likelihood that a partic-
ular transition from a state will be taken when the state-machine is evaluated.
We manually modify the conditions, to affect the behaviour of the simulation.
We may wish to focus on exploring the state in a particular region. For instance,
to test an engine-stop scenario, we require that the engine is in the ENG RUN-
NING state, the gear is in NEUTRAL, the clutch is in the RELEASED state,
and the steering NOT USED. Fig. 5 shows that we want large probabilities of
transitions leading to the states that we want, and small ones departing.
For a given simulation run we can define attracting and repelling states.
Here, ENG RUNNING is an attracting state; that is, we want the state-machine
to be in that state or moving towards it most of the time. To achieve this we can
adjust the branch conditions, to increase the probability of the transitions that
lead to that state, being taken. For instance to increase the probability of the
engine going from ENG OFF to ENG CRANKING we can modify the statement
to read (StopStart01b random <= 3990). In addition to this, we propose to
record the navigated transitions, for transition coverage analysis. So, we will be
able to use the data also, to guide the simulation. We show two simulation runs
here, with the text output defined in the Task Body, Run1 uses the ‘unmodified’,
generated code; it simply loops and never reaches the ENG RUNNING state.
With the branch conditions modified, as described, Run 2 shows the simulation
cycling from ENG RUNNING to ENG OFF ; and with the indicator lamp
changing to inform the driver of the situation.
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Run 1
.ENG Start Order FALSE
..ENG Stop Order FALSE
...EngMode ENG OFF
....SSE Lamp OFF . . .
Run 2
.ENG Start Order FALSE
..ENG Stop Order TRUE
...EngMode ENG RUNNING
....SSE Lamp OFF
.ENG Start Order FALSE
..ENG Stop Order TRUE
...EngMode ENG STOPPING
....SSE Lamp ORANGE STOP
.ENG Start Order FALSE
..ENG Stop Order TRUE
...EngMode ENG OFF . . .
5 Conclusions
We have shown how we generate Ada code from State-machines, and illustrated
the approach with a case study based on an automotive engine controller, auto-
matic stop-start system. We describe how we simulate the environment, and a
multi-tasking implementation. We gain an insight into how we adjust the con-
ditions to provide meaningful simulation runs, which should be useful in the
ADVANCE project. In future work we intend to record the transition coverage,
and feed this back to the simulator, to ensure all transitions are covered. We
will also investigate the interaction between the generated code, environment
simulations, and ProB.
References
1. Event-B State Machines. Details available at http://wiki.event-
b.org/index.php/Event-B Statemachines.
2. J. R. Abrial. Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering. Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
3. A. Edmunds and M. Butler. Tasking Event-B: An Extension to Event-B for Gen-
erating Concurrent Code. In PLACES 2011, February 2011.
4. A. Edmunds, A. Rezazadeh, and M. Butler. Formal Modelling for Ada Implemen-
tations: Tasking Event-B. In Ada-Europe 2012: 17th International Conference on
Reliable Software Technologies, June 2012.
5. R. Gmehlich, F. Loesch, K. Grau, J.C. Deprez, R. de Landtsheer, and C.Ponsard.
DEPLOY Deliverable D38, D1.2 Report on Enhanced Deployment in the Automo-
tive Sector. Technical report, Robert Bosch GmbH and CETIC, 2011.
6. R. Silva, C. Pascal, T.S. Hoang, and M. Butler. Decomposition Tool for Event-B.
Software: Practice and Experience, 2010.
7. Renato Silva and Michael Butler. Shared event composition/decomposition in event-
b. In FMCO Formal Methods for Components and Objects, November 2010. Event
Dates: 29 November - 1 December 2010.
8. The Advance Project Team. The Advance Project. Available at
http://www.advance-ict.eu.
9. The DEPLOY Project Team. Project Website. at http://www.deploy-project.eu/.
Kyoto 37 November 13, 2012
Lessons Learned/Sharing the Experience of
Developing a Metro System Case Study
Renato Silva
University of Southampton,
ras07r@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Abstract. In this document we share the experiences gained throughout
the development of a metro system case study. The model is constructed
in Event-B using its respective tool set, the Rodin platform. Starting
from requirements, adding more details to the model in a stepwise man-
ner through refinement, we identify some keys points and available plug-
ins necessary for modelling large systems (requirement engineering, de-
composition, generic instantiation, among others), which ones are lacking
plus strengths and weaknesses of the tool.
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1 Introduction
Event-B [1] is a formal method that allows modelling and refinement of systems.
From the experiences during DEPLOY1, there exists a natural instinct to model
a system such that it mimics its implementation. That is not always the best
approach: models should be used to understand the system and its behaviour;
the implementation should be seen as an independent task. This document aims
to guide modellers by describing the experiences gained throughout the devel-
opment of a metro system case study, suggesting “rules of thumb”, modelling
techniques and assessing the current tool support (Rodin platform [2]).
We build a metro system model in a “top-down” style, in Event-B based on
safety properties, starting from an abstraction view of the system and gradually
augmented it with more details. Generic instantiation [3,4,5] and decomposi-
tion [6] are techniques used in the case study, simplifying the formal development
by reusing existing models and avoiding re-proofs. Some requirements are based
on real ones for metro system carriage doors.
A brief overview of the Event-B language is given in Section 2. The construc-
tion of the metro system model is described in Section 3, including a discussion of
the keys points for building of a formal model such as requirements, abstraction,
refinement, proofs, decomposition, generic instantiation in the Rodin platform.
We finish with conclusions and related work in Section 4.
1 DEPLOY - Industrial deployment of system engineering methods providing high
dependability and productivity - supported by the EU Commission (Grant 214158)
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2 Background
Event-B is a formal modelling method for developing correct-by-construction
hardware and software systems. An Event-B specification is divided into two
parts: a static part called context and a dynamic part called machine. A ma-
chine SEES as many contexts as desired. A context consists of sets, constants
and assumptions (axioms) of the system. An Event-B model is a state transition
system where the state corresponds to variables v and transitions are repre-
sented by a collection of events evt in machines. The most general form of an
event is: evt =̂ any t where G(t, v) then S(t, v, v′) end , where t is a set
of parameters, G(t, v) is the enabling condition (called guard) and S(t, v, v′) is
a before-after predicate computing after state v′. Essential to Event-B is the
formulation of invariants I(v): safety conditions/properties to be preserved at
all times. Proof obligations (PO) are generated for all system transitions to vali-
date and ensure that these conditions are preserved. Because Event-B advocates
the use of refinement, additional PO (forward refinement) [1] are generated to
ensure that concrete refinements preserve the abstract models’ properties. The
Event-B toolset is Rodin [2], result of an EU research project2: software tool,
based on modern software programming tools created to help the development
of specifications based on the idea that large complex or critical projects should
start with modelling and reasoning about its specification.
3 Case study construction
In this section the steps followed throughout the construction of our model are
described. The safety-critical metro system case study describes a formal ap-
proach for the development of embedded controllers for a metro3. Butler [7]
makes a description of embedded controllers for a railway using classical B. Our
starting point is based on that work but applied to a metro system. That work
goes as far as our first decomposition. We augment it by refining sub-components,
adding requirements and instantiating emergency and service doors in carriages.
3.1 Requirements
Requirements analysis [8] in systems engineering, encompasses tasks that go into
determining the needs or conditions to meet for a new or altered product, tak-
ing account possible conflicting requirements of the various stakeholders, such as
beneficiaries or users. There are several techniques to deal with requirements and
they vary according to projects’ domains. Moreover guidelines [8] have been de-
veloped to achieve this goal. Nevertheless requirements are often described in an
informal manner. Consequently it is hard to reason about each requirement: ex-
perienced people are able to detect contradictions and uncertainties but it is not
2 RODIN:Rigorous Open Development Environment for Open Systems (EU IST Proj)
3 The Event-B model built is available at http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/23135/
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guaranteed that all will be uncovered. Moreover, within the formal methods do-
main, it is hard to trace informal requirements with the model/implementation.
Although not available when we developed this case study, a requirement
plug-in (ProR [9,10]) now exists for the Rodin platform, supporting ReqIF 1.0.1
Standard4. Benefits of ProR are incremental creation of hierarchical require-
ments structures from informal requirements or providing traceability between
requirements and formal models. Furthermore, the system description, mixing
formal and informal artefacts may contain assumptions about the environment
or requirements properties and ProR can reason about them (possibly uncover-
ing contradictions and uncertainties).
Our metro system is characterised by trains, tracks circuits (also called sec-
tions or CDV and a communication entity (comms) that allows the interaction
between trains and tracks. The trains circulate in sections and before a train
enters or leaves a section, a permission notification must be received. In case of
hazard situations, trains receive braking notifications. Track is responsible for
controlling the sections, changing switch directions (switch is a special section
that connects different routes and can be either divergent or convergent) and
sending signalling messages to the communication entity. These are the main
requirements for this case study (some described in Fig. 1):
1. Route sections are all connected and cannot have empty gaps (inv1).
2. There are no loops in the route sections: sections cannot introduce loops
(thm3). Moreover no circularity is allowed (via transitive closure: thm4).
3. Switches cannot be connected and can be either divergence or convergent.
4. Non-switches have at most one successor and at most one predecessor section.
5. Trains circulate in tracks (inv4, inv5, inv7), preserving transitive closure.
6. Trains occupy at least one section plus a safety distance (inv4).
7. Trains cannot be in the same section at the same time (trains crashed: inv13).
8. Comms handles messages exchanged between trains and tracks. Trains head-
ing to an occupied section receive a negative access and braking message.
9. As part of the safety requirements, all trains have an emergency button.
10. While the emergency button is enabled, the train cannot speed up (braking).
11. If a train door is opened, then the train is stopped (in a platform or due to
an emergency). In contrast, if the train is moving, then its doors are closed.
3.2 Abstraction
Following a “top-down” design, the development starts with an abstraction
model: description that encompasses the main aspects and goals the system
intends to answer, obstructing itself from the implementation and other details.
Getting a good abstraction is a very hard task requiring an accurate under-
standing of the system. Moreover the abstraction is the basis of the development
playing a crucial role in the entire model. A good abstraction is often not achieved
at first attempt even for experienced developers. It may change throughout the
4 ReqIF: Requirements Interchange Format - http://www.omg.org/spec/ReqIF/
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development to fit additional requirements that came into play on a later stage
or when, after a few refinements, it does not fit exactly as initially desired. No
tools are available that help finding the right abstraction mainly because each
system has its specific properties. It often relies on experience and empiric re-
search. Nevertheless we believe that systems can be categorised according to
some common properties, architecture and behaviours and therefore having a
abstraction template repository could be helpful when starting a model devel-
opment. Abstraction templates could then be customised according to specific
needs. Unfortunately such repository does not yet exist, requiring further inves-
tigation beyond the scope of this paper.
For our abstraction model (Fig. 1), we focus on the main properties: tracks
are divided into sections that are connected (Reqs. 1, 2, 3, 4); trains circulate in
tracks (Req. 5); the most important (safety) global property introduced initially
states that trains cannot be in the same section at the same time (Reqs. 6, 7).
machine MetroSystem_M0 sees MetroSystem_C0 
 
variables next // Currrent connectivity based on switch positions 
          trns // Set of trains on network 
          occp // Occupancy function for section 
          occpA // Initial cdv occupied by train 
          occpZ // Final   cdv occupied by train 
          braking speed 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 next ! net 
  @inv2 next " CDV # CDV 
  @inv3 trns ! TRAIN 
  @inv4 occp " CDV $ trns 
  @inv5 occpA " trns % CDV 
  @inv6 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpA(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv7 occpZ " trns % CDV 
  @inv8 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpZ(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv9 braking ! trns 
  @inv10 speed " trns % ) 
  @inv11 &tt·tt"trns * card(occp([{tt}])>1 ' occpA(tt) + occpZ(tt)  
  @inv12 finite(occp() 
  @inv13 &t1,t2·t1"trns * t2"trns * t1+t2 ' occp([{t1}],occp([{t2}]=- 
  theorem @thm1 next " cdvfn 
  theorem @thm2 tcl(next) = next . (next;tcl(next)) // tcl(next) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 (&s·s!next([s]'s=-)'tcl(next),(CDV / id)=- // next has no 
loops 
  theorem @thm4 &tt,s·tt"trns * s ! next0occp([{tt}] ' tcl(s) = s .  
(s;tcl(s)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next 1 next0 
      @act2 trns 1 - 
      @act3 occp 1 - 
      @act4 occpA 1 - 
      @act5 occpZ 1 - // occpZ ! " 
      @act6 braking 1 - 
      @act7 speed 1 - 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Excerpt of MetroSystem M0 : variables and invariants
3.3 Refinement
Refinement allows the co struction of a model in a gradual way, making it closer
to an implementation [3]. At same time, the overall correctness of the system
is preserved. Our case study heavily uses refinement as seen in Fig. 2. At each
refinement step, new requirements are introduced to the model and consequently
new invariants, variables, events are introduced or refined. For instance, for re-
finement Train M1, the invariants and properties imposed are:
1. There is a limit to the number of carriages per train.
2. If a carriage alarm is activated, the train’s emergency button is also active.
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3. The sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train.
4. Trains have states: maintenance, manual, automatic.
5. If a train is not in a maintenance state, then it must have the correct number
of carriages and the leader carriage must be defined already.
6. If a train is in maintenance, then it must be stopped.
7. The emergency brake is activated if a train exceeds the maximum speed.
Do it right at first/Recursion As for abstraction, refinement steps are not
reached at first attempt. They evolve, accommodate different requirements and
also change, impacting previous refinements. And that comes with a cost : a
change in the abstraction, affects all the following refinements and the adjust-
ment to each refinement level has to be done manually, which is cumbersome.
In our case, the emergency brake requirement (Req. 9) was only added after we
had reached the first decomposition. The consequences propagated to the ab-
straction, impacting most events and manual reproving (which delayed for a few
days the progress achieved before). This is a limitation of the refinement process
in the tool that does not propagate the changes, requiring improvements.
3.4 Proofs and model construction
Proofs play an important role in formal modelling, checking that properties and
behaviours are preserved. There is always a compromise between representing a
system, avoiding complex proofs and tool limitations. Despite the plug-ins avail-
able for automated proof solving (AtelierB provers [11], Relevance Filter[12]),
complex proofs tend to be avoided. From our experience, a complex proof hard
(but not impossible) to discharge, often means that the model is overcomplicated
and may be rewritten/simplified. When building Train M2, train doors were rep-
resented as (DOOR CARRIAGE; train carriage)−1, where DOOR CARRIAGE ∈
DOOR→CARRIAGE represents carriage doors and train carriage ∈ CARRIAGE
7→trns represents the train carriages. Although that relation is enough to describe
which doors are part of a train, from a proof viewpoint was very unsuccessful.
By rewriting train doors as variable door train carriage = (DOOR CARRIAGE;
train carriage)−1 and invariants door train carriage ∈ trns↔DOOR,
door train carriage−1 ∈ DOOR 7→ trns, we solved the issue.
From a tool viewpoint, there is a direct relation between the number of
PO per refinement and performance. Our criteria to choose which properties to
add per refinement were directly related with the PO generated per refinement:
if over 150 PO, additional properties were stated in new refinements. Train
requirements are spread over 4 refinement steps for that reason. Improvements
have been made in terms of tool performance in the latest releases but large
developments (over 15 refinements and large number of events) are still affected.
3.5 Decomposition
The “top-down” style of development used in Event-B allows the introduction
of new events and data-refinement of variables during refinement steps. A con-
sequence of this development style is an increasing complexity of the refinement
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process when dealing with many events and state variables. Model decomposi-
tion [6] addresses such complexity by cutting a large model into smaller com-
ponents. Two methods have been identified for the Event-B decomposition and
are supported by a Rodin plug-in [6]: shared variable [3] and shared event [13].
Because decomposition is monotonic [13], the generated sub-components can be
further refined independently: sub-components can be used to further refined
the original model or be used in other models. Moreover team development
can be introduced: different developers can share parts of the same original
model by working independently in parallel with the resulting decomposition
sub-components. Decomposition also partition PO which are expected to be
easier to discharge in sub-components. In our model, decomposition is used for
following reasons: separation of aspects; model architectural decision; tool per-
formance: building/proving is faster for separated models than for monolithics.
Decomposition is recursively used as seen in Fig. 2: splitting the initial mono-
lithic model into three parts (Train, Middleware and Track) from an archi-
tectural point of view (separation of aspects); splitting Train M4 into Leader-
Carriage (due to the number of POs and separation of aspects) and Carriage
and later on to decompose Carriage into CarriageInterface and CarriageDoor
(Fig. 3(b)). Although we could have used either decomposition styles, we used
the shared event style mainly because in that manner, we did not constrain the
refinement of variables (like it happens for shared variables).
Unfortunately the decomposition process does not propagate modifications
on the original machine and consequently, decomposed components need to be
regenerated if the original component is modified. If the decomposed compo-
nents have been refined, than the modifications need to be reflected in those
refinements (notified via errors or PO being generated or requiring reproving).
We believe that the decomposition tool requires improvements in terms of prop-
agation changes to minimise the overall impact that is inevitable.
Fig. 2. Overall view of the metro system development
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3.6 Generic Instantiation
Generic Instantiation can be seen as a way of reusing components and solving
difficulties raised by the construction of large and complex models [3]. Generic
developments (single machine or a chain of refinements) are reused, originating
components with similar properties instead of starting from scratch. Reusabil-
ity occurs via the instantiation and parameterisation of patterns. [4] proposes a
generic instantiation approach for Event-B by instantiating machines. The goal
is to reuse a pattern as an instance in an existing development (problem) consist-
ing of a chain of refinement of machines S0 to Sk (S stands for Specific problem)
as seen in Fig. 3(a). The instance sees the parameterisation context CIG (that
(a) Instantiation of G0..Gj via
parameterisation context CIG
creating instance IG to fit
problem S0..Sk.
(b) Carriage Refinement Diagram and Door In-
stantiation
Fig. 3. Generic Instantiation
extends the specific problem context CS) containing the replacement properties
for the elements in context CGi. Variables, events and parameters can be re-
named to fit new or existing elements in the specific problem. The correctness
of the instantiation relies on reusing the pattern PO and ensuring that assump-
tions in the context parameterisation are satisfied in the instance. In our case
study, an existing development of carriage doors (GCDoor M0..GCDoor M2 ) is
used as a pattern with all the related PO previously discharged. The pattern
is instantiated and parameterised accordingly into emergency doors and service
doors (Fig. 3(b)). The main pattern requirements are:
1. Doors have a state associated: open (train must be stopped) or closed.
2. When adding/removing a carriage to a train, doors must be closed for safety.
3. Actions involving the doors may result from commands (open, close, isolate,
remove isolated) sent from the central door control.
4. Doors must be closed and locked before a train starts moving.
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5. Doors are opened by the following devices: manual platform, manual internal
or automatic central door.
6. Doors can get obstructed when closed automatically (people/object obstruc-
tion). If an obstruction is detected, a second attempt is made to close them.
7. Doors can be isolated in case of malfunction or for safety reasons.
8. If a door is obstructed, then it must be in a state corresponding to open.
These requirements are shared between both emergency and service doors
highlighting the use of instantiation. Additional requirements for each kind of
door can be added in further refinements (emergency doors are only available
for emergencies, do not respond to standard open command, etc). For our case,
the instantiation was manual. Nevertheless currently a generic instantiation pro-
totype is available [5]. The tool needs to mature and requires improvements in
terms of matching the pattern and the last refinement of problem. In this case
study, the matching was manually achieved through decomposition.
Animation/Model Checker and Code Generation Although we are mainly
interested in safety properties, ProB model checker [14] proved to be a very useful
tool. At some stages, all PO were discharged but ProB showed that the system
was deadlocked. In larger developments, these situations may occur frequently.
Therefore we suggest safety properties preservation (via PO) and running ProB
to confirm deadlock freeness. Another option, to be addressed by ADVANCE5 is
to introduce liveness properties (e.g. enabledness). Regarding implementation, a
code generation plug-in6 [15] (Event-B to Ada or C) is available.
Statistics Table 1 describes the statistics of the model in terms of variables,
events and PO (including automatically discharged) for each refinement. Al-
most 3/4 of the PO were discharged automatically. The case study conditions
Vars Events PO/Auto
TransitiveClosureCtx − − 10/10
MetroSystem C0 − − 5/3
MetroSystem C1 − − 0/0
MetroSystem M0 7 10 75/64
MetroSystem M1 10 13 17/17
MetroSystem M2 12 17 78/57
MetroSystem M3 12 17 24/22
Track 4 10 0/0
Train 7 14 0/0
Middleware 1 4 0/0
Train M1 9 16 74/52
Train M2 13 21 155/79
Vars Events PO/Auto
Train M3 12 21 65/24
Train M4 14 21 119/89
LeaderCarriage 9 21 0/0
Carriage 5 11 0/0
Carriage M1 6 11 28/21
CarriageInterface 4 11 0/0
CarriageDoors 2 5 0/0
CarriageDoorsInst M0 2 5 2/1
GCDoor M0 2 5 6/6
GCDoor M1 9 15 81/80
GCDoor M2 10 22 170/153
Total 909/678(74.6%)
Table 1. Statistics of the metro system case study
5 ADVANCE project: Advanced Design and Verification Environment for Cyber-
physical System Engineering- http://www.advance-ict.eu/
6 Code generation plug-in: http://wiki.event-b.org/index.php/Code_Generation
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were the following: Rodin v2.1 (Auto Builder: OFF; Auto Prover: OFF), Model
Decomposition v1.2.1 and Shared Event Composition plug-in v1.3.1, Generic
instantiation was done manually (tool support was not available), ProB v2.1.2.
4 Related Work and Conclusions
From the experience of developing formal models involving a large number of re-
finements, development tools reach a saturation point where it is not possible to
edit the model due to the high amount of resources required (or very slowly). De-
composition is a possible solution that alleviates the issue by splitting the model
into tool manageable dimensions, separating concerns, decreasing the number
of events and variables per sub-component which results in more manageable
models. Generic instantiation reuses pattern and respective PO per instance.
The experience of modelling a metro system in Event-B using the Rodin
platform and its plugins, is shared in terms of model design and assessment
of available tools. Requirements are defined and modelled through refinement.
As an architectural decision and to alleviate the problem of modelling a mono-
lithic component, the model is decomposed several times. Benefiting from an
existing development for carriage doors GCDoor, this pattern is used to instan-
tiate two kind of carriage doors: service and emergency doors. The refinement
of Carriage is decomposed, originating CarriageDoor that matches with pattern
GCDoor M0. Although the instantiation is similar for both cases, the resulting
instances can be further refined independently. Generic instantiation minimises
the proving effort reusing the pattern GCDoor PO (in the overall 257). Therefore
we achieve our goal of reusing existing developments and discharging as little
PO as possible. Even the interactive proofs were relatively easy to discharge
once the correct tactic was discovered. This task would be more difficult with-
out decomposition due to the elevated number of hypotheses to be considered.
Nevertheless the effort of discharging PO could be further minimised by having
an easy way to reuse PO tactics. A limitation of this model is not addressing
liveness properties through proofs which would enrich the model.
Although we use Event-B, these techniques are generic enough to suit other
formal notations and other case studies. Formal methods has been widely used
to validate requirements of real systems. The systems are formally described
and properties are checked to be preserved whenever a system transition occurs.
Usually this result in complex models with several properties to be preserved,
therefore structuring and reusability are pursued to facilitate the development.
Lutz [16] describes the reuse of formal methods when analysing the requirements
and designing the software between two spacecrafts’ formal models. Stepney et
al. [17] propose patterns to be applied to formal methods in system engineering.
Using the Z notation, several patterns (and anti-patterns) are identified and
catalogued to fit particular kind of models. These patterns introduce structure to
the models and aim to aid formal model developers to choose the best approach
to model a system, using some examples. Although the patterns are expressed
for Z, they are generic enough to be applied to other notations. Comparing with
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the development of our case study, the instantiation of service and emergency
doors corresponds to the Z promotion, where a global system is specified in
terms of multiple instances of local states and operations. Although there is
not an explicit separation of local and global states in our case study, service
and emergency doors states are connected to the state of CarriageDoor and
we even use decomposition, instantiation and refactoring to fit into a specific
pattern. Stepney [17] suggests template support and architecture patterns to be
supported by tools. We agree and aim to address this issue in the future by
having categorised templates customised according to the modeller’s needs.
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Abstract. We show how the event-based notation offered by Event-B
may be augmented by algorithmic modelling constructs without disrupt-
ing the refinement-based development process.
1 Introduction
One of the lessons of the DEPLOY project [5] is that the industrial application of
formal modelling cannot fully succeed by employing just one notation, paradigm
and methodology. In the case of Event-B [2], one of the language strong sides at
the level of abstract design - a simple and versatile notation suitable for a wide
range of abstractions - makes the language difficult to apply to concrete designs.
Unstructured event-based models often become unwieldy long and verbose when
design and implementation decisions are added.
In this paper we discuss a proposal to extend the event-based notation of
Event-B with algorithmic constructs that permit an efficient specification of a
large class of concrete designs.
Our extension, language SLP (sequential composition, loop, parallel compo-
sition), is a compact formal modelling notation with strictly defined syntax and
semantics. To stay on the same technological platform as Event-B, we define the
language semantics as a list of FOL verification conditions. We adopt without
changes the mathematical language of Event-B - the part of the notation used
to define predicates and expressions. The languages also borrows the notation
and the atomicity assumption of Event-B substitutions.
Rather than a replacement or a simple superposition of algorithmic and event
styles we propose to have a seamless connection between Event-B and SLP where
a high-level event specification is gradually transformed into an algorithmic spec-
ification with explicit concurrency and control flow (see Fig. 1).
The defining difference between SLP and Event-B is that the latter is data-
driven while the former features explicit control flow for sequential computation
and units of concurrency for concurrent computations. This requires a departure
from a flat machine structure, apt for inductive reasoning but often onerous in
practice for large models, to a hierarchical model with nested naming scopes
delineating verification concerns.
2 Syntax
An SLP model is made of the following three main parts. The first, taken ver-
batim from Event-B, provides definitions of types, axiom, variables, invariants
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Event-B
Event-B
SLP
Event-B
SLP
SLP
Fig. 1. The SLP approach promotes a gradual transition from an event-based
to an algorithmic specification.
and theorems. This part may also contain Event-B events in the case of a mixed
Event-B/SLP model.
The second part is the definition of environment activities. In SLP, we take
a view that actions performed by an environment must be explicitly defined as
such. This is not just a syntactic notion - SLP offers differing refinement rules
(not discussed in this paper) for environment and system activities.
The final part is the definition of the behaviour of a modelled system. It takes
the form of a list of so-called process definitions - concurrent units of system
behaviour. The body of a process is defined by a succession of atomic state
updates (substitutions, in the Event-B terminology) connected by the typical
algorithmic control structures - sequential composition, if and loop. A process
body runs in an infinite loop until it explicitly executes a termination command.
The processes of a system and environment activities execute concurrently.
They interact by reading and writing shared (global) variables. A system process
may also define its private (local) variables to deal with computations that do
not need to be exposed to environment or other system processes. For a given
process, the universe of the process is the set of all other processes and all the
environments.
The following is the top-level structure of an SLP specification:
slp := 〈invdef 〉∗
〈environment〉∗
〈process〉+ ;
〈invdef 〉 := (invariant | theorem) 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉 ;
To simplify the presentation, we omit the declaration of constants and sets while
variable declarations are deduced from invariants. 1 All the variables defined at
the global level are seen by system and environment processes. These should be
the variables used to model input/output between the environment and system
components. Like in Event-B, we split invariant conditions to label and partition
invariant preservation conditions.
An environment is a labelled pair of a rely and guarantee predicates. Like
invariants, rely and guarantees are labelled.
1 Note that this is our preferred concrete syntax. The abstract syntax for these ele-
ments is exactly that of Event-B
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〈environment〉 := environment 〈label〉 〈reldef 〉∗ 〈gardef 〉∗ end;
〈reldef 〉 := rely 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉 ;
〈gardef 〉 := guar 〈label〉 : 〈predicate〉 ;
The following is an example of an environment describing the behaviour of
a temperature sensor. The environment may update value of t (current temper-
ature) by changing it in some small increments defined by constant ∆. A rely
predicate is omitted and assumed to be ⊤.
environment temp sensor
guar guar1 is t′ ∈ t−∆ .. t+∆
end
A system activity, called a process, follows the template of an environment
but may also define local variables and concrete behaviour specification.
〈process〉 := process 〈label〉 〈reldef 〉∗ 〈gardef 〉∗ 〈invdef 〉∗ 〈block〉? end;
Informally, the body of a process is the implementation that is shown to tolerate
the interference defined by the process rely and satisfy the obligation of the
process guarantee. In an extreme case of a solipsistic process there may be no
rely and guarantee predicates so that the process has no specific obligations to its
universe. Such a process specifies a sequential algorithm that runs till completion
without any interaction.
Continuing the theme of the sensor example, with the syntax discussed, we
can already define a small but meaningful specification. The temperature sensor
t belongs to the environment while the system controls the heater modelled by
variable heater:
invariant temp : t ∈ Z
invariant heater : h ∈ BOOL
environment temp sensor :
guar guar1 is t′ ∈ t−∆ .. t+∆
end
process heater control
rely rel1 : t ∈ SAFE TEMP
guar guar1 : t > TEMP HIGH ∧ h = TRUE⇒ h′ = FALSE
guar guar2 : t < TEMP LOW ∧ h = FALSE⇒ h′ = TRUE
end
There may be any number of environment and process parts. One may, for
instance, add an alarm process to detect an abnormal temperature range.
invariant alarm : alarm ∈ BOOL
process alarm control
guar guar1 : alarm′ = bool(t /∈ SAFE TEMP)
end
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Note that the rely of heater control is not always satisfied by the sensor be-
haviour. A system process is temporarily disabled if its rely is broken by an
environment. A process, however, may not violate the rely of another process or
an environment.
The body of a process describes how the activity defined by its guarantee
predicate is realised. The following operators are used to build the body of a
process:
〈block〉 := 〈action〉 ; 〈block〉 ;
〈action〉 := 〈statement〉 atomic? 〈refines〉? 〈with〉?
〈statement〉 := 〈substitution〉 | 〈if 〉 | 〈loop〉 | 〈begin end〉 | 〈assert〉 | stop ;
〈if 〉 := if 〈predicate〉 then 〈block〉
(elseif 〈predicate〉 then 〈block〉)∗
(else 〈block〉)? end ;
〈loop〉 := while 〈predicate〉
〈invdef 〉∗
var 〈expression〉
then 〈block〉 end ;
〈begin end〉 := begin 〈invdef 〉∗ 〈block〉 end ;
〈assert〉 := (assert (〈label〉 :)? 〈predicate〉)+
Most of the syntax is self explanatory. The stop statement terminates a process;
assert p asserts the truth of p; 〈substitution〉 and 〈expression〉 are Event-B
substitution and expression elements (see Rodin Deliverable D7 [7] for concrete
definitions). Block begin end defines the scope of visibility for local variables.
Elements atomic, 〈refines〉 and 〈with〉 are used to define the refinement rela-
tionship between SLP models but are not discussed in this paper.
A trivial implementation of heater control retells the implications in the pro-
cess guarantee as an if statement:
process heater control
rely rel1 : t ∈ SAFE TEMP
guar guar1 : t > TEMP HIGH+ δ ∧ h = TRUE⇒ h′ = FALSE
guar guar2 : t < TEMP LOW− δ ∧ h = FALSE⇒ h′ = TRUE
if t > TEMP HIGH + δ ∧ h = TRUE then
act1 : h′ := FALSE
elseif t < TEMP LOW − δ ∧ h = FALSE then
act2 : h′ := TRUE
end
end
2.1 Semantics
Similar to Event-B, the semantics of SLP is given as a list of verification condi-
tions called proof obligations. We discuss only the consistency conditions showing
Kyoto 51 November 13, 2012
that the SLP part of an Even-B/SLP model does not violate invariants and in-
troduce deadlocks and divergences. Informally, the purpose of consistency proof
obligations is to establish the following three facts:
– when control is passed to a statement, the state update defined by the state-
ment may take place;
– any statement does not take the system outside of the safety invariant
bounds;
– a statement eventually terminates.
We begin by cataloguing the major syntactic elements of a specification.
The following are coming from Event-B and are shared between Event-B and
SLP models: constants c, carrier sets s, axioms P (c, s), global variables v and
invariant I(c, s, v).
There are elements specific to SLP. Taking the viewpoint of a substitution S
located somewhere in the body of a process, they are: the rely R(c, s, v, v′) and
guarantee G(c, s, v, v′) of a current process; process variables u (must be distinct
from v); process invariant T (c, s, v, u); variables defined in enclosing begin . . .
and while . . . blocks, w = {w1, . . . , wi} (all distinct); begin . . . and while . . .
block invariants Bi(c, s, v, u, w1, . . . , wi); assertion predicate A(c, s, v, u,w) ex-
pressed directly in a preceding assert or derived from other kind of a preceding
statement; and, finally, the substitution itself - S(c, s, v, u,w, v′, u′,w′).
The following shorthand is used to identify syntactic element in the context of
substitution S. Assume that S is contained inside i nested blocks begin/while
that define some local variables u and w. In the scope of S(. . . ) the actual
invariant is Ii, as defined below. The invariant defines the state space Ωi on
which the update defined by S takes the effect: {z | S(z)} ⊆ Ωi×Ωi.
Ii =


P (c, s)
I(c, s, v)
T (c, s, v, u)∧
j≤i Bj(c, s, v, u, w1, . . . , wj)


A = A(c, s, v, u,w)
S = S(c, s, v, u,w, v′, u′,w′)
Ωi = {z | Ii(z)}
Ω
√
i = Ωi ∪{
√}
Extended state Ωi ∪{
√} adds a termination symbol √ from which no continua-
tion is possible. Globally, the set of all names spaces forms a tree such that the
state of an inner wholly contains the state of outer space: Ω0 ⊆ Ω1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ωn
where Ω0 is the state of a name space of containing just global variables and Ωn
is the state of some current block within the body of a process.
To define verification conditions, we convert SLP statements into relations
describing the connection between previous and next states. All the partial state
update relations are treated as guarded relations (i.e., never applied outside of
their domain) and loops are required to terminate to ensure total correctness.
We write II meaning [Ii], I meaning [I], A for [A] and so on.
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. . .
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else be end
}
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⋃
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u
wwv
while c
invariant LI
var V
then b end
}
~
i
:=
r
assert ¬c ∧ LI ∧ trm
(
C,LI, V,
q
b
y
i+1
)z
i
u
wwv
begin
invariant BI
b
end
}
~
i
:=
(
[BI]⊳
q
b
y
i+1
∩ (Ωi×Ωi)
)⋄
Operator r⋄ extends a relation r ⊆ Ωi×Ω
√
i to a total relation r
′ ⊆ Ωi ←↔Ω
√
i
so that mappings not covered by r are taken from id(Ωi): r
⋄ = {x 7→ y | x 7→
y ∈ r ∨ x 7→ y ∈ id(Ωi) \ r} = id(Ωi) ⊳− r. Also, as a shorthand, for some
predicate x ∈ ΩI →BOOL we write [x] to mean a set of elements satisfying x:
[x] = {e | x(e)}.
In the definition of a loop, V ∈ Ωi→N is a loop variant and trm is a ter-
mination condition expressing that the variant value is decreased by each loop
iteration: trm(C,LI, V, b) ≡ ∀x, y · x ∈ V [b[st]] ∧ y ∈ V [st] ⇒ x < y, where
st ≡ I ∩ [LI ∧ c].
Note the two rules for sequential composition. The a ; b case defines the
conventional sequence-to-relational-join rule. The preceding rule (of a higher
precedence) makes the sequential composition ’forgetful’ when an assertion is
placed between two statements: the information about previous statements is
dropped and the focus is placed on the last statement and the preceding asser-
tion. One reason for this is that a chain of substitutions may lead to a large
and intractable set of hypothesis preventing efficient automated proof and in-
troduce an undesirable interdependency between substitutions where a change
in one substitution could invalidate proofs done for successive substitutions. An
assertion breaks such a chain making the proof context smaller. Another reason,
specific to our technique of refining Event-B into SLP, is the use of assertions
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to prove that the set of enabling states of a refined substitution does not grow
larger in a refined model.
The following is a list of the more important proof obligation, given, for
brevity, in a relational form.
Well-definedness SLP mirrors the Event-B approach of proving that each partial
relation is well-guarded. In other words, we prove that a relation defined by
statement a may be applied to a current state: (II ∩ A) ⊳ qay 6= ∅.
Feasibility of rely The rely must not contradict an invariant: I⊳ R ⊆ I× I.
Closure of rely Conditions involving rely invariably require tolerating any num-
ber of rely iterations. To simplify corresponding proof obligations we insists that
a rely relation R is reflexively and transitively closed: id(Ωi) ⊆ R ∧ R ◦ R ⊆ R.
Invariant preservation Invariant properties of model variables are assumed to
hold before every substitution. It must be proven that all invariants known in the
scope of a substitution are re-established by the substitution:
q
a
y
[II ∩ A] ⊆ II.
Not that when statement a is located in the body of a loop II also includes the
loop invariant.
Variant A loop variant is based on the same principles as Event-B variant and
is embedded into the rule converting a loop into a relational form.
Establishing guarantee A substitution executed by a process must agree with a
process guarantee. Formally, any state update would be covered by a ’promise’
expressed in the guarantee: (II ∩ A)⊳ qay ⊆ G.
Establishing assertion An asserted condition An must be implied by a previous
assertion or a statement. We must take into the account the fact that between
previous and current statements the universe might have changed its state. For
this, the latest locally known state is ’blurred’ by the rely condition of a process.
– if two assertions follow each other then the second must be contained in the
first: (A⊳ R) [II] ⊆ An;
– otherwise, if an assertion is preceded by a substitution, the preceding sub-
stitution after-state must imply the assertion:
(
R ◦ qay) [II] ⊆ An;
– otherwise, an assertion must be established by an invariant: R[II] ⊆ An.
Process compatibility All non-environment processes must be compatible w.r.t.
their rely/guarantee conditions: I⊳ GA ⊆ RB.
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3 From Event-B to SLP
SLP is not a standalone formalism and is meant to complement the Event-
B notation when one needs to obtain a detailed design expressed in terms of
parallel processes and algorithmic constructs. Thus, there is always a stage when
a pure Event-B specification undergoes a transformation into an Event-B/SLP
specification.
One simple case of Event-B to Event-B/SLP refinement is introducing en-
vironments and processes operating on new variables. In a general case, the
Event-B part is refined to make use of new variables so that there is an informa-
tion flow between the two parts. Naturally, there are no specific proof obligations
for this case: one only needs to discharge the consistency conditions.
A more interesting situation is the replacement of Event-B events with SLP
constructs. Of all possibilities, we shall only consider the simplest one: refinement
of a set of events by new (rather than existing) environments and processes.
New environment (process) A new SLP environment (process) may be defined
to refine one or more abstract Event-B events; refined events disappear from a
model. The relevant proof obligation is that a process guarantee is contained in
the behaviour of refined events: (I ∩ R)⊳ G ⊆ [e1]R ∩ · · · ∩ [en]R.
New concrete process A sub-set of machine events may be refined into a process
with a body. We focus on a simpler case when this is done in a single refinement
step. Without loss of generality, we consider the case of refinement where substi-
tutions of a process body coincide exactly with substitutions of refined events,
in other words, a refinement that forms a process from events without any fur-
ther behavioural or data refinement that may take place in following refinement
steps.
Let E be the set of events of machine M describing the behaviour of a
prospective process P and tr(M) ↾ E be the machine traces limited to events E.
Let tr(P ) be a set of traces of a new process in terms where each trace element
is the list of labels of parallel substitution parts. It is easy to define a mapping f
from the alphabet of tr(P ) to set E (it is not necessarily a one-to-one mapping
but this does not pose problems). If one can prove that f(tr(P )) ⊆ tr(M) ↾ E
and, separately, that process P does not introduce new divergences then process
P is declared to refine events E. We have previously shown how to convert a
statement of the form f(tr(P )) ⊆ tr(M) ↾ E into a list of FOL theorems [3, 4].
4 Small Example
We illustrate the Event-B/SLP hybrid modelling by showing a simple case of
Event-B to SLP refinement. The model computes the greatest common devisor
(GCD) of two numbers. Function gcd ∈ N × N → N axiomatically satisfies the
following properties:
Kyoto 55 November 13, 2012
axm1 : ∀a, b · a, b ∈ N ∧ a > b⇒ gcd(a, b) = gcd(a− b, b)
axm2 : ∀a, b · a, b ∈ N ∧ b > a⇒ gcd(a, b) = gcd(a, b− a)
axm3 : ∀a · a ∈ N⇒ gcd(a, a) = a
At an abstract level, one may use the constant function gcd to compute the
result in one step:
machine gcd0
variables r, x1, x2
invariant r ∈ N ∧ x1 ∈ N ∧ x2 ∈ N
initialisation r :∈ N ‖ x1 :∈ N ‖ x2 :∈ N
events
gcd = begin r := gcd(x1 7→ x2) end
end
Variables x1 and x2 serve as input values and r holds the result. The following is
a typical Event-B refinement based on the unfolding of an atomic abstract step
into a sequence of concrete computations.
refinement gcd1a
refines gcd0
variables r, x1, x2, y1, y2, pc
invariant
y1 ∈ N ∧ y2 ∈ N
pc ∈ 1 .. 5
pc = 2⇒ gcd(x1 7→ x2) = gcd(y1 7→ x2) ∧ y1 > 0 ∧ x2 > 0
pc = 3⇒ gcd(x1 7→ x2) = gcd(y1 7→ y2) ∧ y1 > 0 ∧ y2 > 0
pc = 4⇒ gcd(x1 7→ x2) = gcd(y1 7→ y2) ∧ y1 > 0 ∧ y2 > 0
initialisation . . . ‖ y1 :∈ N ‖ y2 :∈ N ‖ pc := 1
events
copy1 = when pc = 1 then y1 := x1 ‖ pc := 2 end
copy2 = when pc = 2 then y2 := x2 ‖ pc := 3 end
sub1 = when y1 > y2 ∧ pc ∈ {3, 4} then y1 := y1− y2 ‖ pc := 4 end
sub2 = when y2 > y1 ∧ pc ∈ {3, 4} then y2 := y2− y1 ‖ pc := 4 end
gcd = when y1 = y2 ∧ pc = 4 then r := y1 end
end
Events sub1 and sub2 form the body of a loop. An auxiliary variable pc is used
to simulate control flow; variables x1, x2, y1, y2 are introduced to describe the
concrete computation steps. Note how the after state of each event is encoded in
model invariant. The repeating template v = C⇒. . . in invariants is an indicator
that an event-based specification is used to simulate concrete control flow.
The SLP version of the same refinement step is given below. Here we have an
explicit loop construct containing a two-branch if that makes for a more concise
specification without the need to propagate state properties via an invariant.
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refinement gcd1b
refines gcd0
variables r, x1, x2, y1, y2
invariant y1 ∈ N ∧ y2 ∈ N
initialisation . . . ‖ y1 :∈ N ‖ y2 :∈ N
process main
y1 := x1 ‖ y2 := x2 ;
while y1 6= y2 then
invariant gcd(x1 7→ x2) = gcd(y1 7→ y2) ∧ y1 > 0 ∧ y2 > 0
if y1 > y2 then y1 := y1− y2
elseif y2 > y1 then y2 := y2− y1 end
end ;
r := y1
end
end
Essential to the proof of refinement is the last case of sequential composition
where control is passed from a loop to an assignment saving the final result. The
relational interpretation of the loop asserts the loop invariant and the negation
of the loop condition which immediately give that r = y1 = gcd(x1 7→ x2).
5 Conclusion
The implementation language of B-Method, B0 [1] is one of the inspirations for
this works. There are, however, important differences in both aims and tech-
niques employed: B0 allows a modeller to write more detailed bodies of abstract
operations using the concepts from programming languages. In contrast, in SLP,
the main development technique is an aggregation of several abstract events into
a body of a process. This means that a data-driven design of Event-B may be
refined into an algorithmic design whereas in B0 it would have to remain data-
driven at the top level. Equally important is an explicit treatment of concurrency
that becomes more and more relevant topic in embedded systems design. We
use rely/guarantee [6] approach to model cooperation of concurrent processes
via shared variables.
Event-B is rather obviously lacking in means of control flow specification.
One solution is the integration of two narrowly specialised two notation, i.e.,
CSP‖B that combines B and CSP [9]. Another is extension of the basic notation
with means to explicitly define control flow, i.e., the Flow plug-in for Rodin [3].
In this paper we followed a different direction with a premise that a deficiency of
a notation in a certain area is best rectified by coming up with a new notation.
This leads us to the following crucial point: to make Event-B applicable
in any given problem domain it may be necessary to (1) design a specialised
concrete syntax exposing Event-B method in a way tailored to the problem
domain (for example, a graphical notation like the one offered by UML-B [8])
and (2) devise a specialised notation and refinement rules for concrete designs,
like the one shown in this paper. The use of Event-B for an abstract design
puts a development on a solid and well-studied platform. But concrete designs
incorporating implementation decision must offer the concepts, terminology and
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structuring principles already employed and recognised in the target problem
domain. In this sense, the language defined in this paper is merely a technological
demonstration that such a direction is viable.
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Abstract. Interactive proofs are often considered as costs of formal
modelling activity. In an incremental development environment such as
the Rodin platform for Event-B, information from proof attempts is im-
portant input for adapting the model. This paper considers the idea of
using interactive proofs to “improve” the model, in particular, to convert
them into automatic ones. We propose to lift some essential proof infor-
mation from the interactive proofs into the model as what we called proof
hints. In particular, proof hints are not only for the purpose of proofs: it
helps to understand the formal models better.
Keywords: Event-B, formal modelling, proof hints, the Rodin platform
1 Introduction
Event-B is a refinement-based modelling method, which can be used to develop
various types of systems. Starting with an abstract specification, several refine-
ment steps gradually introduce more details into the formal models in a consis-
tent manner. An important part of an Event-B formal model is the verification
conditions generated as proof obligations. The task of discharging these obli-
gations is first given to some automated provers. Afterwards, remaining undis-
charged proof obligations are required to be proved interactively. Typically, man-
ual proofs are considered as “costs” of development, given the required human
interaction for produced them, and the difficulty in maintaining them when the
formal models evolve.
As the size of models grows, the complexity of the associated proof obligations
also increases, hence interactive proofs are inevitable. Improving the performance
of the automatic provers has been considered with some success [3,4,2]. Despite
the improvement in the percentage of automatic proofs, interactive proofs are
still an obstacle in developing and maintaining formal models.
In this paper, we attempt to answer the following question. Can we improve
our formal models in such a way that helps the proofs? After all, modelling using
refinement is also a way of structuring the proof of correctness of the models.
We propose some notions to encapsulate essential proof details extracted from
interactive proofs within the formal model. We call the additional information
to the formal models “proof hints”.
Some form of proof hints already exists in Event-B, e.g., “witnesses” or “the-
orems”. These useful features are designed not only to help with proving the
correctness of the model but also to give more information about the particular
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model, i.e., why it is correct. In fact, “proof hints” should help to understand the
formal model better.
We consider the current state of Rodin Platform (Rodin) and show two kinds
of useful proof information that can be included in the formal models, namely,
to select hypotheses and to perform a proof by cases.
Select hypotheses Indicates that some facts (e.g., invariants or axioms) are
required for discharging the obligations.
Perform a proof by cases Indicates that the proof can be discharged by con-
sider different cases.
We show that the effect of the proof hints can be “simulated” at the moment by
some modelling “tricks” in Event-B.
In the long term, we propose to have an extension to Event-B and to Rodin,
to have proof hints as a part of the model and to implement a plug-in for inter-
preting the proof hints and applying these hints appropriately during proofs.
Organisation. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives
some background on Event-B and Rodin. Section 3 presents our ideas of proof
hints. Section 4 illustrates proof hints by means of two examples. Section 5
discusses some proposals for the tool support. We give some conclusions in Sec-
tion 6.
2 Background
2.1 The Event-B Modelling Method
An Event-B model corresponds to a discrete transition system and is divided
into two parts: a static part called context and a dynamic part called machine. A
context may contain carrier sets (types), constants, axioms (assumptions about
sets and constants). For clarity, we omit references to context in the sequel.
Machines may contain variables, invariants, and events. Variables v define
the state of a machine and are constrained by invariants I (v). An event e can
be represented as e =̂ any x where G(x , v) then Q(x , v) end , where x
stands for the event’s parameters, thus allowing for state changes. The guard
G(x , v) states the necessary condition under which an event may occur. The
action Q(x , v) describes how state variables v evolve when the event occurs.
The short form e =̂ when G(v) then Q(v) end is used when the event
does not have any parameters, and we write e =̂ begin Q(v) end when, in
addition, the event’s guard equals true. A dedicated event in the last form is
used for the initialisation event (init). The action of an event is composed of one
or more assignments of the form: v := E (x , v), v :∈ E (x , v), v :| P(x , v , v ′),
specifying v becomes E (x , v), v becomes an element of E (x , v), and v becomes
such that P(x , v , v ′) holds, respectively. All assignments of an action Q(x , v)
occur simultaneously. As a result, each event e is associated with a before-after
predicate, denoted as Q(x , v , v ′).
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The invariant preservation proof obligation (INV) states that invariants are
maintained whenever variables are updated. For each event e, the corresponding
proof obligation is as follows.
I (v),G(x , v),Q(x , v , v ′) ` I (v ′) (INV)
All predicate modelling elements, e.g., axioms, invariants, guards, can be also
declared as theorems. Theorems need to be proved when they are declared. As
an example, a theorem in guard must be proved to be a consequence of axioms,
invariants, and previously declared guards.
Machine refinement is a mechanism for introducing details about the dy-
namic properties of a model [1]. The states of the abstract machine M are related
to the states of the concrete machine N by gluing invariants J (v ,w), where v
and w are the variables of the abstract and concrete machine, respectively. Each
event e of the abstract machine is refined by a concrete event f (later we will
relax this constraint). Assume that the concrete event is of the following form
f =̂ any y where H (y ,w) then R(y ,w) end . Somewhat simplifying, we can
say that e refines f if the gluing invariant establish a simulation of f by the e.
This is presented as the following obligation.
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w),R(y ,w ,w ′) ` ∃x , v ′ ·G(x , v) ∧Q(x , v , v ′) ∧ J (v ′,w ′) (REF)
In order to split the above proof obligation, Event-B introduces the notion of
“witnesses” for x and v ′. The witnesses are predicates W1(x , y , v ,w ,w ′) (for x )
and W2(v ′, y , v ,w ,w ′) (for w ′), which are required to be feasible, i.e., satisfying
the following proof obligations.
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w) ` ∃x ·W1(x , y , v ,w ,w ′) (WFIS1)
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w),R(y ,w ,w ′) ` ∃v ′ ·W2(v ′, y , v ,w ,w ′) (WFIS2)
The witnesses supply instances of x and v ′ (provided that they exist) for in-
stantiating the proof obligation REF. Given the witnesses, the refinement proof
obligation REF can be split into the following proof obligations.
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w),W1(x , y , v ,w ,w
′) ` G(x , v) (GRD)
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w),R(y ,w ,w ′),W1(x , y , v ,w ,w ′),W2(v ′, y , v ,w ,w ′) ` Q(x , v , v ′)
(SIM)
I (v), J (v ,w),H (y ,w),R(y ,w ,w ′),W1(x , y , v ,w ,w ′),W2(v ′, y , v ,w ,w ′) ` J (v ′,w ′)
(INV)
In the course of refinement, new events are often introduced into a model.
New events must not modify abstract variable v . When an abstract event e is
refined by more than one concrete events f, we say that the abstract event e is
split and prove that each concrete f is a valid refinement of the abstract event.
A concrete event f can refine two (or more) abstract events e, provided that the
abstract events are only different in guards. We say that the abstract events are
merged into the concrete event f. It is required to prove that the guard of f is
stronger than the disjunction of the guards of the abstract events.
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2.2 Proving with the Rodin Platform
Rodin is an Eclipse-based tool chain for analysing and reasoning about Event-B
models. Models are developed incrementally within the platform. Two main ac-
tivities of developers are modelling and proving (as illustrated in Fig. 1). Proof
obligations are generated from modelling and are input to the proving activity.
Information about proof attempts from proving are input to the modelling activ-
ity to “improve” the models. In particular, failed proof attempts usually indicate
some problems with the models and give hints on how the models can be fixed,
e.g., to strengthen the guard of some events or to add some missing invariants
into the models.
Modelling Proving
proof obligations
proof attempts
Fig. 1. Developing Event-B models using Rodin
Obligations are proved either automatically or manually. In automatic mode,
Rodin uses some predefined proof tactics made up of internal and external
provers to discharge the obligations. In interactive mode, the user “guides” the
proof attempts by applying some simple proof steps to simplify the obligations
before invoking some trusted external provers to finish the proofs. As interactive
proofs require manually intervenions, it is usually considered as some costs of
developing formal models. Moreover, maintenance of interactive proofs is diffi-
cult: a change in the formal model more often invalidates the interactive proofs.
As a result, improving the rate of automatic proofs will also help to maintain
the models better.
We consider some common interactive proof steps, e.g., to add hypothesis, to
select hypotheses, and to perform a proof by cases.
Add hypothesis This proof step corresponds to the following proof rule.
H ` P H, P ` G
H ` G
CUT
The rule allows add P as a hypothesis, provided that it can be proved from
the current hypotheses H.
Select hypotheses Rodin has a notion of selected hypotheses which is used
by some external provers. Often, too many irrelevant hypotheses will have
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negative effect on the performance of external provers. By restricting the set
of hypotheses available to these external provers, the user helps the external
provers to concentrate on using only some relevant hypotheses. An example
for selected hypotheses are guards of an event: they are by default selected
for proof obligations related to the event.
Perform a proof by cases This proof step allows user to perform a proof by
cases, with respect to some condition P .
H, P ` G H,¬P ` G
H ` G
CASE
The proof is split into two branches accordingly.
3 Proof Hints
There are existing work for improving the rate of automatic proofs. Recently,
some links to external provers such as Isabelle [4], SMT [2] have been added to
Rodin. Selected hypotheses can be calculated according to some heuristic [3].
However, interactive proofs are still unavoidable. We look at the problem from a
different angle: to convert interactive proofs into automatic proofs by improving
the formal models, essentially exposing some proof information in the formal
models. We call these additional proof information proof hints.
There is already several such proof information existing in the Event-B mod-
els, normally being seen as part of the model rather than some exposed proof
information.
– Theorems in the model is a special case of adding a hypothesis in an inter-
active proof.
– Automatic selection of guards for the event’s proof obligations.
– The witnesses can be seen as some hints for manually instantiating the ex-
istential goal of the general proof obligation REF, which results in three
sub-obligations GRD, SIM, and INV.
In principle, any proof information can be lifted to be proof hints, part of the
model. However, revealing the actual proof is certainly undesirable: this could
have negative effects on the understanding of the model. In fact we want only
to exposing essential information about the proofs. We believe that the criteria
for proof hints should be as follows.
1. They should help to automate more proofs.
2. They should help to better understand the model.
While the first criteria is straightforward, our emphasis is on the second
criteria. Once again, low level proof information is irrelevant for understanding
of the model. We only want to have essential key important proof steps as hints,
in order to justify about the correctness of the formal models.
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4 Some Useful Proof Hints
This section presents two kinds of proof hints, namely to select hypotheses and
to perform a proof by cases.
4.1 Select Hypotheses
During an interactive proof section, the developer can complete the proof by
selecting some hypotheses and invoke one of the provers that uses only selected
hypothesis, e.g., AterlierB P0. The solution to make the proof become auto-
matic is to (somehow) give hints to Rodin to select these additional hypotheses
automatically.
Example Consider the following specification containing two variables x and y .
The machine has a single event1 called set, which assign y + 1 to x when x is
either 1 or 2.
variables: x , y
invariants:
hypSel0_1 : x ∈ N
hypSel0_2 : x 6= 0⇒ y ∈ N
set
when
grd1 : x ∈ {1, 2}
then
act1 : x := y + 1
end
We are interested in proof obligation set/hypSel0_1/INV stating that event set
maintains the invariant hypSel0_1.
x ∈ N, x 6= 0⇒ y ∈ N, x ∈ {1, 2} ` y + 1 ∈ N
The proof obligation cannot be discharged automatically. In particular, by de-
fault, the selected hypotheses are hypSel0_1 and grd1. The obligation can be
discharged by selecting hypSel0_2, and invoke external provers using selected
hypotheses, such as AterlierB P0.
Workaround A simple workaround to have hypSel0_2 being selected automat-
ically is to add the invariant as a theorem in guard of set.
set
when
grd1 : x ∈ {1, 2}
thm1 : x 6= 0⇒ y ∈ N
then
act1 : x := y + 1
end
1 For clarity we omit the initialisation event init.
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The additional theorem can be removed in further subsequent refinement if nec-
essary.
Proposal The disadvantages of the above approach are as follows.
– This introduces extra proof obligations to prove that the copies of the in-
variants are theorems in guard (even though those proof obligations are
discharged automatically).
– Recopying the text of the invariants is error-prone.
– Reformulating invariants leads to the need for changing the text of the extra
theorems.
Our proposal is to have a specific “proof hint” for events. This form of proof
hints will specify the invariant/theorem need to be used automatically. For ex-
ample, we could extend event set with the following hint of using hypSel0_2
for the maintenance of hypSel0_1.
set
when
x ∈ {1, 2}
then
x := y + 1
hints
use hypSel0_2 for hypSel0_1
end
4.2 Perform a Proof by Cases
Sometimes, during an interactive proving session, the user suggests a predicate
P in order to do a “proof by cases”. The subsequent branches of the proof can
be discharged easily. It is hence desirable to have this hint about performing a
proof by cases in the model. Automatic provers often do not apply the case splits
automatically, since this potentially leads to blow up in terms of the number of
sub-goals.
Example Consider the following specification with three variables a, b, c.
variables: a, b, c
invariants:
case0_1 : a ≤ c
case0_2 : a 6= 1⇒ b = a + 1
case0_3 : a = 1⇒ b ≤ c
set
begin
a := b − 1
end
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The interesting proof obligation to look at is set/case0_1/INV.
a ≤ c, a 6= 1⇒ b = a + 1, a = 1⇒ b ≤ c ` b − 1 ≤ c
Informally, the reasoning follows the cases of either a = 1 or a 6= 1 and applying
case0_2, case0_3 accordingly. Hence we would like to give the hints about
the case split. The obligation is not discharged by the default automatic prover
within Rodin.
Workaround In order to “simulate” the effect of introducing this proof hints,
we first split the event into two sub-events, guarded by corresponding conditions.
set_case1 =̂ when a = 1 then a := b − 1 end
set_case2 =̂ when a 6= 1 then a := b − 1 end
The original event set can be obtained by merging the above two events using
refinement.
set
refines set_case1, set_case2
begin
a := b − 1
end
which leads to a trivial proof obligation to prove about merging events.
Proposal There are several disadvantages of the workaround:
– Splitting of event and merging using refinement is artificial.
– Splitting of events leads to double number of proof obligations (those that
does not need the case split).
Our proposal is to provide a hint directly in the model about the case split.
set
begin
a := b − 1
hints
split case using a = 1 for case0_1
end
5 Ideas on Tool Support
Given the extensibility of Rodin, having proof hints as additional elements of
Event-B models would be straightforward. How the hints are interpreted and
work with the automatic provers of Rodin is a more challenging topic. There are
some options for the implementation of the “hint-interpreter”.
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The first option is to have the interpreter to effect the generated proof obli-
gations. For example, two different proof obligations are generated according to
the “proof-by-cases” hint to replace the original proof obligation. This requires
to alter the Proof Obligation Generator (POG) of Rodin to take into account
the hints. The second option is to leave the original proof obligations untouched
and to incorporate the hints at the start of a proof, i.e., they can be applied
before the automatic provers are invoked.
At the moment, we are investigating these options for tool support. The first
option is similar to witnesses in event refinement, to split proof obligation REF
into obligations GRD, SIM, and INV. As a result, it changes the generated proof
obligations of Event-B models, which might be undesirable. In particular, the
number of proof obligations generated can be different depending on whether
proof hints are present. The second option applying proof hints at the beginning
of each proof, works for the two illustrated proof hints presented within this
paper. In general, we might want to have more general proof hints that should
be apply in the middle of a proof, or even combining different hints in one proof.
6 Conclusion
We presented some ideas about the notion of “proof hints” for Event-B and
discusses the possibilities of extending the supporting Rodin platform. In a broad
term, proof hints essentially are proof information that are added to the model.
We proposed two kinds of proof hints in this paper, for suggesting selected
hypotheses and performing proof-by-cases. We presented some workaround at the
moment to “simulate” the proof hints and to automate some proofs in the current
version of Rodin. The illustrated examples are simple and seem to be unrealistic.
However, they are extracted from some large development (adapted accordingly).
Their simplicity is not too illustrate the weakness of Rodin’s automatic provers,
but rather to support the argument that formal proofs of systems are challenging
tasks.
Often when describing an Event-B formal model, we also need to explain why
the model is correct, e.g., why guard strengthening or invariant preservation is
satisfied. Proof hints should give some information (but not too much) to answer
the questions about the correctness of models. It would be the ultimate goal of
having self-explained formal models, not only in terms of how they works (e.g.,
events) and what their properties are (e.g., invariants), but also why they are
correct.
We do not propose proof hints as a way to avoid interactive proofs. More
often, we need to perform some interactive proof steps, in order to figure out
or understand why the obligation can be discharged. The role of proof hints
therefore is to convert some interactive proofs into automatic ones, helping the
model to be more resilient to changes.
In the long term, we might want to extract the essence of proofs as some
high-level structured proofs (similar to Isabelle/Isar [5]). This requires more
9
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investigation in terms of the usefulness of such an approach, and subsequent
tool support.
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Abstract. Event-B is a formal approach oriented to system modeling
and analysis. It supports renement mechanism that enables stepwise
modeling and verication of a system. By using renement, the complex-
ity of verication can be spread and mitigated. In common development
using Event-B, a specication written in a natural language is examined
before modeling in order to plan the modeling and renement strat-
egy. After that, starting from a simple abstract model, concrete models
in several dierent abstraction levels are constructed by gradually in-
troducing complex structures and concepts. Although users of Event-B
have to plan how to abstract the specication for the construction of
each model, guidelines for such a planning have not been suggested.
Specically, some elements in a model often require that other elements
are included in the model because of semantics constraints of Event-B.
As such requirements introduces many elements at once, non-experts of
Event-B often make renement rough though rough renement does not
mitigate the complexity of verication well. In response to the problem, a
method is proposed to plan what models are constructed in each abstrac-
tion level. The method calculates plans that mitigate the complexity well
considering the semantics constraints of Event-B and the relationships
between elements in a system.
Keywords: Formal Methods, Renement, Event-B, Specications, Ab-
straction
1 Introduction
Event-B [2] is a formal approach oriented to system-level analysis and modeling.
Event-B users specify models in a notation based on set theory and rst order
logic and check the model by proving.
The most notable feature of Event-B is the support for renement mech-
anism. In a renement process, users rst construct a simple and highly ab-
stract model. After checking the consistency in the abstract model, more com-
plex model is constructed and the consistency between the abstract model and
the complex model is checked. Usually complex models are constructed by in-
troducing new aspects and properties of a system. Users gradually construct
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concrete models by repeating this step. Renement enables users to construct
a complex model more simply rather than to construct the complex model at
once. Therefore, the burden of a model construction is mitigated by Event-B.
As Event-B is an eective method, it has been attracting more and more at-
tentions from the industry. For example, many companies in Japan are interested
in formal methods including Event-B, while technical and administrative guide-
lines are constructed through cooperation of a national institute and software
vendors [1].
Renement enables users to spread the complexity of modeling over some
steps. However, it is necessary to properly dene how elements are gradually in-
troduced, mitigating the complexity while complying with semantics constraints
of Event-B. In this paper, we propose a method that considers the constraints
and relationships between elements of a system and plans what models should
be constructed for an eective renement. Thus the method enables ordinary
users to leverage the renement mechanism in a simple way.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
problem and the cause of the problem. Section 3 describes the proposed method
together with exemplication on an example. Section 4 shows related work as
well as future work, before concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Problem and Approach
In usual modeling in Event-B, users rst read the specication of the system
written in a natural language. Then models in several abstraction levels are
constructed gradually. Event-B supports checking constructed models but does
not guide modeling explicitly. Thus users have to plan what models are con-
structed in each abstraction level. Specication of a system is composed of a set
of statements about property of the system. We call such statements artifacts.
For example, a specication of a library management system may include an ar-
tifact \There are no loaned books in the open stack.". Usually, Event-B models
include invariants that correspond to a subset of artifacts of the system. Thus,
users have to plan which subset of artifacts of the system should be reected
to models of each abstraction level. When constructing a concrete model, new
artifacts are added to artifacts of the abstract model. Therefore users need to
plan which artifacts are introduced to each abstraction level.
In Event-B models, artifacts are expressed as invariants using the formal
language of Event-B. Thus, in order to express an artifact, it is necessary to
introduce elements (e.g. career sets, constants, variables, and events) that cor-
respond to terms appeared in the artifact. We call such terms phenomena. For
instance, an artifact \There are no loaned books in the open stack." can be
expressed like \openstack \ dom(loan state) = ;" (Where openstack  books
and loan state 2 books 7! members) only when openstack and loan state are
already introduced to the model.
Such constraints on the introduction of phenomena exist not only between an
artifact and phenomena but also between a phenomenon and phenomena. That
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is, in some cases, an introduction of a phenomenon requires an introduction of
some other phenomena. The causes of such constraints on introduction include
the following two facts.
Firstly, all variables and constants in an Event-B model have to be typed as a
primitive type (a built-in data type or an element of a career set as a user-dened
type) or a pair that is recursively built from primitive types. A primitive type
is atomic and not expressible by using other primitive types. For example, if a
variable var is typed as S by using a career set S in an abstract model and typed
as T ! N by using a career set T and a built-in data type N in a concrete model, a
type error will occur. Thus, any typing statement of a phenomenon should not be
changed through renement. Therefore, a phenomenon corresponds to a variable
or a constant can be introduced only when phenomena that are necessary to
type the variable or constant are already introduced. For instance, in order
to introduce a phenomenon \loan state" and express its type as loan state 2
books 7! members, the introduction of career sets books andmembers is needed.
Thus, it is also required to introduce phenomena that corresponds to career sets
books and members.
Secondly, Event-B has several criteria for consistency between an abstract
model and a concrete model. In modeling in Event-B, users can conrm consis-
tency of models by proving them (proof obligations). There is a proof obligation
named EQL, which requires that if a variable is included in both an abstract
model and a concrete model there must not be a state transition such that it is
included in the concrete model but not included in the abstract model. In order
to make a renement consistent EQL proof obligation must hold. Therefore a
phenomenon corresponds to a variable can be introduced in a model only when
state transitions that change the value of the variable are already introduced.
For example, the introduction of a variable that corresponds to a phenomenon
\loan state" requires an introduction of all state transitions included in the be-
havior of the system (e.g. \loaning a book from the open stack", \returning a
book", \loaning a reserved book").
For these reasons, an introduction of an artifact to a model requires intro-
ductions of 1) phenomena that appear in the artifact and 2) phenomena that
are required by 1). Let A = (Ai)i=0;1;(A0 = ;) be a sequence of sets of ar-
tifacts reected to the nth model, req a(a) be the phenomena required by an
introduction of an artifact a, and req as(Ai) =
S
a2Ai req a(a) for a set of ar-
tifacts Ai. When an artifact is introduced, phenomena that are not introduced
yet but required for an introduction of the artifact are also introduced. Then,
let int pi(A) = req as(Ai) n req as(Ai 1) (1 < i)3. It denotes newly installed
phenomena to the ith model in a sequence of artifacts sets (Ai)i=0;1;.
Consider the introduction order of artifacts a and b such that req a(a) =
fp1;    ; p10g, req a(b) = fp6;    ; p10; qg to an empty model (Figure 1). For
A1 = fag; A2 = fa; bg, the newly introduced phenomena will be as follows:
int p1(A) = req a(a) = fp1;    ; p10g, int p2(A) = req a(b) n req a(a) = fqg.
In contrast, For B1 = fbg; B2 = fa; bg, the newly introduced phenomena will
3 In this paper, the relative complement of a set T in a set S is denoted by S n T .
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be as follows: int p1(B) = req a(b) = fp6;    ; p10; qg, int p2(B) = req a(a) n
req a(b) = fp1;    ; p5g.
req as(∅)
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
q
+10 phen
∪ req a(a)
+6 phen
∪ req a(b)
req as({a})
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
q
req as({b})
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
q
+1 phen
∪ req a(b)
+5 phen
∪ req a(a)
req as({a, b})
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
q
Fig. 1. Dierence between Two Introduction Orders
Therefore, (jint p1(A)j, jint p2(A)j) = (10; 1), whereas (jint p1(B)j,
jint p2(B)j) = (6; 5). Thus, the number of newly introduced phenomena in each
model will vary depending on the introduction order of artifacts. As renement is
a mechanism to mitigate the complexity of modeling by spreading the introduc-
tion of phenomena over some steps, how much the numbers of newly introduced
phenomena are dispersed is useful information for users to plan renement.Thus,
we dene the eectiveness of an introduction order of artifacts as in Denition 1.
For instance, the order (a; b) is more eective than (b; a) in the above example.
Moreover, an order (Ai)i=0; ;3 such that (numA;i)i=1;2;3 = (3; 1; 2) is more
eective than an order (Bi)i=0; ;3 such that (numB;i)i=1;2;3 = (0; 3; 3) since
(snumA;i)i=1;2;3 = (3; 2; 1) is smaller than (snumB;i)i=1;2;3 = (3; 3; 0) in lexico-
graphical order.
Denition 1. Let a sequence (numA;i)i=1; ;jAj be a history of the number of
phenomena newly introduced in each renement (i.e. numA;i = jint pi(A)j) and
a sequence (snumA;i)i=1; ;jAj be a sorted permutation of (numA;i)i=1; ;jAj in
descending order. Then, for a sequence (Ai)i=0; ;jAj and (Bi)i=0; ;jBj such
that req as(AjAj) = req as(BjBj), (Ai)i=0; ;jAj is called more eective than
(Bi)i=0; ;jBj, if (snumA;i)i=1; ;jAj is smaller than (snumB;i)i=1; ;jBj in lexi-
cographical order.
As in the above example, users should plan an introduction order of artifacts so
that the renement is eective. However, for this planning, users have to grasp
and compare the constraints on introduction between phenomena over multi-
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Table 1. Artifacts of Library Management System
Artifact Phenomena Appeared in the Artifact
a \Loan is done only for members" loan state, members
b \Books on loan are not in the open stack" loan state, books, open stack state
c \No reserved books are in the open stack" reservation state, books, open stack state
Table 2. Events of Library Management System
Event Caused State Transitions
p1 Loaning a reserved books Remove one from reservation state,
Add one to loan state
p2 Returning a book Remove one from loan state
p3 Loaning a book from the open stack Remove one from open stack state,
Add one to loan state
ple steps. The constraints are too complex for users to analyze in their heads.
Therefore, Event-B users (especially beginners) have to repeat trial and error
processes during modeling many times. Thus, though renement is a powerful
mechanism, it is not so easy to use renement in realistic situations.
3 Method
3.1 Derivation of Required Phenomena
As we viewed in Section 2, the eectiveness of renement depends on the sets of
phenomena required by artifacts. The phenomena required by an artifact depend
on types and state transitions related to phenomena that appear in the artifact.
In the proposed method, constraints on introduction between phenomena related
to types and state transitions are assumed as the input. The output of the
method is orders that maximize the eectiveness of renement.
To illustrate the method, construction of a model of a library management
system is described. The artifacts of the system are as shown in Table 1 and the
events of the system are as shown in Table 2. Events represent behavior of the
system. An event can cause multiple state transitions.
Phenomena can be classied into four kinds according to what kind of element
in an Event-B model corresponds to the phenomenon. Phenomenon corresponds
to a career set, a constant, a variable, or an event.
Let PS, PC, PV, and PE be the set of phenomena that correspond to career
sets, constants, variables, and events, respectively. Let P = PS [ PC [ PV [ PE
and T be the set of state transitions.
Let typed : P ! 2PS be a set of career sets required for typing a constant or
a variable, changed by : P ! 2T be a set of state transitions that change the
value of a variable, and caused by : T ! 2PE be a set of events that causes a
state transition.
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p1 (event)
loaning 
reserved book
 (state trans.)
remove one from
reservation state
caused_by
 (state trans.)
add one to
loan state
caused_by
p2 (event)
returning
 book
 (state trans.)
remove one from
loan state
caused_by
p3 (event)
loaning book
from
open stack
caused_by
 (state trans.)
remove one from
open stack state
caused_by
p4 (var)
reservation state
p7 (set)
members
typed
p8 (set)
books
typed
p5 (var)
loan state
typed typed
p6 (var)
open stack state
typed
changed_by changed_by changed_by changed_by
Fig. 2. Constraints on Introduction between Phenomena in Library Management Sys-
tem
The proposed method takes these three functions as the input from the users.
For example, constraints on introduction between phenomena in the library man-
agement system can be depicted as in Figure 2.
The set of career sets required for typing a phenomenon can be derived by
tracing typed edges. The set of events that change a phenomenon can be derived
by tracing changed by edges and caused by edges. Therefore, let req p(p) be the
phenomena required by an introduction of a phenomenon p, then req p(p) can
be derived by the input. That is,
req p(p) = typed(p) [
[
t2changed by(p)
caused by(t) : (1)
Thus, req a(a) can be derived by the input. That is,
req a(a) = appear(a) [
[
p2appear(a)
req p(p) : (2)
Where appear(a) denotes the phenomena that directly appear in an artifact a.
By constraints on introduction depicted in Figure 2 and Equations (1) and (2),
req a of each artifact in the library management system is derived as follows:
req a(a) = f p1, p2, p3, p5, p7, p8 g
req a(b) = f p1, p2, p3, p5, p6, p7, p8 g
req a(c) = f p1, p3, p4, p6, p7, p8 g
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Table 3. All Introduction Order of Artifacts in Library Management System
(int ai(A))i=1;2;3 (jint pi(A)j)i=1;2;3 Eectiveness Rank
(fag; fbg; fcg) (6; 1; 1) 1
(fag; fcg; fbg) (6; 2; 0) 2
(fcg; fag; fbg) (6; 2; 0) 2
(fcg; fbg; fag) (6; 2; 0) 2
(fbg; fag; fcg) (7; 0; 1) 3
(fbg; fcg; fag) (7; 1; 0) 3
3.2 Search for the Best Introduction Orders of Artifacts
Let int ai(A) = Ai n Ai 1 (1 < i). It denotes newly introduced artifacts to
the ith model. We assume that only one artifact is introduced through one
renement step. Then, jint ai(A)j = 1 (1 < i) and req as(Ai) = req a(a) [
req as(Ai 1) (1 < i) where a = jint ai(A)j.
In the proposed method, orders that correspond to sequences (Ai)i=0; ;jAj
that maximized the eectiveness of the renement are obtained by Algorithm 1.
All orders of artifacts introduction ((int ai(A))i=1;2;3) and the numbers of newly
introduced phenomena ((jint pi(A)j)i=1;2;3) in each renement for the library
management system is as shown in Table 3. In this case, the result of the algo-
rithm represents the order (fag; fbg; fcg).
The method uses breadth rst search with pruning as shown in the Algo-
rithm 1. A node of the search tree represents an introduction order of artifacts.
A structure that represents a node is composed of as that represents the history
of artifacts introduction, ps that represents the set of phenomena introduced so
far, nums that represents the history of the number of introduced phenomena in
each step, max that represents the maximum of nums, and rest that represents
the number of phenomena not introduced yet.
The functionCertainlyBetter (Line 1{19) checks whether an introduction
order of artifacts is certainly eective than the other order. This function is
used for pruning (Line 32, 35). The number of phenomena introduced in a later
renement is at most the number of phenomena not introduced yet
(maybe better:rest) since req as(Ai)  req as(AjAj) for all i. Therefore, an order
is certainly better if the maximum number of introduced phenomena in each
step of the order is at most less than the current maximum of the other order
(Line 5{6). If both maximums are equal, the algorithm retries the checking on
orders without the artifact corresponds to the maximum number (Line 7{15).
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Algorithm 1 Search the Best Introduction Orders of Artifacts
1: function CertainlyBetter(maybe better;maybe worse)
2: if ((maybe better:nums = fg) _ (maybe worse:nums = fg)) then
3: return false . Not sure whether maybe better is better
4: else if fmax(fmaybe better:max;maybe better:restg) <
5: maybe worse:max) then
6: return true . maybe better is certainly better
7: else if maybe better:max = maybe worse:max then
8: new mb reduced;mw reduced
9: mb reduced:nums maybe better:nums n fmaybe better:maxg
10: mw reduced:nums maybe worse:nums n fmaybe worse:maxg
11: mb reduced:max max(mb reduced:nums)
12: mw reduced:max max(mw reduced:nums)
13: mb reduced:rest maybe better:rest
14: mw reduced:rest maybe worse:rest
15: return CertainlyBetter(mb reduced;mw reduced)
16: else
17: return false . Not sure whether maybe better is better
18: end if
19: end function
20: function SearchBestOrder(artifacts; req as; n artif; n phen)
21: orders ffas : fg; ps : ;; nums : fg; max : 0; rest : n phengg
22: repeat
23: for all order 2 orders s:t: length(order:as) is minimum do
24: orders orders n forderg
25: for all a 2 (artifacts n order:as) do
26: new neworder
27: neworder:as append(order:as; fag)
28: neworder:ps req as(neworder:as)
29: neworder:nums append(order:nums; fjneworder:ps n order:psjg)
30: neworder:max max(neworder:nums)
31: neworder:rest n phen  sum(neworder:nums)
32: if not (9o 2 orders s:t: CertainlyBetter(o; neworder)) then
33: orders orders [ fneworderg
34: for all o 2 orders do
35: if CertainlyBetter(neworder; o) then
36: orders orders n fog
37: end if
38: end for
39: end if
40: end for
41: end for
42: until 8o 2 orders : length(o:as) = n artif
43: return orders
44: end function
Kyoto 76 November 13, 2012
4 Discussion
4.1 Related Work
There are some studies on requirement engineering methods for modeling in
Event-B. In [9], Problem Frames and Event-B are applied successfully on an
industrial project. The authors constructed a problem diagram before modeling
in Event-B. They associated elaborations of phenomena in problem diagram with
a data renement in Event-B. The work of [5] proposed an iterative process of
requirement modeling and validation. The authors connected reasoning about
artifacts with renement in Event-B. In [13], Event-B specications are derived
from class and state-machine diagrams. However, renement strategy planning
is not covered in these studies.
There have been many studies which aim at deriving formal specication in
other methods than Event-B from natural language specications or diagrams
like UML [3,4,6{8,10,12,14,15] but renement is not considered in these studies
either.
The authors of [11] proposed a method to derive an abstract specication of
an event. In this study, patterns of correspondences between a KAOS goal model
and an event in Event-B are provided. The patterns also consider a part of proof
obligations that will be generated. From the point of view of renement strategy
planning, this method transforms a renement strategy planning for an event
into a renement strategy planning in a KAOS goal model. On the other hand,
our method plans renement strategy of the whole model by considering the
constraints on introduction between elements in the system. Thus our approach
can be considered as complementary to this work.
4.2 Future Work
Further renement of the proposed method is the primary part of the future
work.
First, we assumed every artifact is not changed through renement. How-
ever, that is not the case in realistic situations. There are many cases that some
artifacts are strengthened in concrete models by using newly introduced phe-
nomena.
Renement of events is also neglected. In realistic situations, many events
are rened through renements. For example, both event \Loaning a reserved
books" and \Loaning a book from the open stack" can rene an event that only
includes \Add one to loan state" state transition.
Moreover, as we viewed in Section 2, we assumed that the complexity of
modeling can be measured only by the number of phenomena. However this
criterion is too rough. For instance, the importance of the number of events and
that of variables are dierent. Thus, ner analysis of complexity of modeling is
needed.
Kyoto 77 November 13, 2012
5 Conclusion
This paper has aimed at resolving complexities in planning of renement strategy
by considering semantics constraints of Event-B. Renement strategy planning
is an important and dicult phase in modeling in Event-B. Therefore, the pro-
posed method facilitates ordinary users to leverage Event-B. Although much
work remains as discussed in Section 4.2, we believe this work promotes system-
atic use of formal specications, more independently from specic knowledge
and skills.
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Abstract. This article presents industrial experience of validating large data sets 
against specification written using the B / Event-B mathematical language and 
the ProB model checker.  
Keywords: B mathematical language, ProB model checker, data validation. 
1   Introduction 
Historically, the B Method [1] was introduced in the late 80’s to design correctly safe 
software. Promoted and supported by RATP1, B and Atelier B, the tool implementing 
it, have been successfully applied to the industry of transportation. Figure 1 depicts 
the worldwide implementations of the B technology for safety critical software, 
mainly as automatic train controllers for metros. Today, Alstom Transport 
Information Solutions, Siemens Transportation Systems and Technicatome-Areva are 
the main actors in the development of B safety-critical software. They share a 
product-based strategy and reuse as much as possible existing B models to develop 
future metros.  
In the mid ‘90s Event-B [2] enlarged the scope of B to analyse, study and specify 
not only software, but also whole systems. Event-B has been influenced by the work 
done earlier on Action Systems [13] by the Finnish School (Action System however 
remained an academic project). Event-B is the synthesis between B and Action 
System. It extends the usage of B to systems that might contain software but also 
hardware and pieces of equipment. In that respect, one of the outcome of Event-B is 
the proved definition of systems architectures and, more generally, the proved 
development of, so called, “system studies” [7][8][9][10][11], which are performed 
before the specification and design of the software. This enlargement allows one to 
perform failure studies right from the beginning in a large system development. 
Event-B has been used to perform system level safety studies in the Railways [12], 
                                                          
1 Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens : operates bus and metro public transport in Paris 
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allowing to formally verify part of the whole system specification, hence contributing 
to improve the overall level of confidence of the railways system being built.  
 
Fig. 1. Worldwide implementations (2012) of systems embedding software generated from B 
models. 
 
However, if the verification of Event-B system specification or B software 
specification is quite easily reachable by semi-automated proof2, verifying embedded 
data against properties3 may turn out to be a nightmare in case of large data sets. For 
the Meteor metro (line 14, Paris), software and data were kept together in a B project 
[5]. Demonstrating data correctness regarding expected properties was really difficult 
as it requires to iterate over large sets of variables and constants (and their domains) 
and the Atelier B main theorem prover4 is not designed for this activity [6], that 
requires more a model checker or constraint solver rather than a theorem prover. Later 
on, software and data started to be developed and validated within two different 
processes, in order to avoid a new compilation if the data are modified but not the 
software.  Data validation started to be entirely human, leading to painful, error-
prone, long-term activities (usually more than six months to manually check 100 000 
data against 200 rules) 
 
In this article, we present a formal approach, based on the B/Event-B mathematical 
language and the ProB model checker and constraint solver, designed and 
experimented by Alstom Transport Information Solutions for the validation of 
railways data. 
 
                                                          
2 Automatic theorem provers usually demonstrate 90-95 % of « well written” B models, the 
remaining has to be demonstrated during interactive sessions with the tool. 
3 In the case of a metro, these data may represent the topology of the tracks, the position of the 
signals, switches, etc. 
4 That is used by both Atelier B and Rodin platform 
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2   The Genesis 
Verifying railways systems covers many aspects and requires a large number of cross-
verifications, performed by a wide range of actors including the designer of the 
system, the company in charge of its exploitation, the certification body, etc. Even if 
complete automation is not possible, any automatic verification is welcome as it helps 
to improve the overall level of confidence. Indeed a railways system is a collection of 
highly dependent sub-system specification and these dependencies need to be 
checked. They may be based on railways signalling rules (that are specific to every 
country or even every company in a single country), on rolling stock features 
(constant or variable train size or configuration) and exploitation conditions.  
In France, AQL RATP laboratory initiated the development of a generic tool, 
OVADO5, to verify trackside data for the metro line 1 in Paris that is being 
automated6. This tool, based on the PredicateB predicate evaluator7, is able to parse 
data (XML, csv or text-based formats), load rules and verify that data complies with 
rules. Initially tested on line 13 configuration data, the tool has been able to check 400 
definitions and 125 rules in 5 minutes. In Fig 2, we see on the left a data (called 
E_a_trainDynamicDeparture_minimum_speed) that associates to a train (refered to by 
an integer index) its minimum speed (a floating point value). It is declared as a total 
function, indexes and minimum speed being reachable in an excel file (A7 containing 
the first index and AM7 the first minimum speed). On the right, a named property is 
described in natural and in mathematical languages. This property may refer to data 
previously defined. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Example of data definition and property 
 
However the PredicateB tool is just a calculator able to manipulate B/Event-B 
mathematical language predicates: it is not able to find all possible values for any 
non-deterministic substitution or to find all counter-examples. Moreover the way the 
errors are displayed may lead to difficult analysis when the faulty predicate is 
complex. 
 
                                                          
5 Tool for checking the B properties on railway invariants, initially developed by ClearSy 
6 A specific tool, initially developed for validating line 14 data, representing more than 300 000 
lines of C++ code, was too difficult to maintain and to adapt to other lines. It was not reused 
for other lines. 
7 Hosted by the Rodin SVN Sourceforge service (http://rodin-b-sharp.svn.sourceforge.net) 
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During the DEPLOY project8, the University of Düsseldorf and Siemens 
Transportation Systems have elaborated a new approach, based on the ProB model 
checker to dramatically reduce validation duration from about six months to some 
minutes [3][4]. Data is extracted from ADA source code and properties come from B 
models. In the case of the San Juan project, 79 files with a total of 23,000 lines of B 
are parsed to extract 226 properties and 147 assertions. The verification took 1017 
seconds and led to the discovery of 4 false formulas. ProB was then experimented 
with great success on several projects: Roissy Charles de Gaule airport shuttle, 
Barcelona line 9, San Paulo line 4, Paris line 1 and Algiers line 1. At that occasion, 
ProB was slightly improved in order to deal with large scale problems and well 
validated in order to ease its acceptance by a certification body. However analysing 
false properties remains difficult. In Fig 3, a failed invariant is listed on the left (the 
one that is rewritten as false) while the counterexample is shown on the right (the 
values used for the data that lead to the breaking of the invariant). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. A false property and its graphical representation 
 
3 DTVT 
Alstom Transport Information Solutions decided to experiment a new approach by 
reusing successful features of previous experiments. A new tool, DTVT, is defined 
and implemented. Its structure is presented in figure 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. DTVT tool structure 
                                                          
8 http://www.deploy-project.eu/ 
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Input data is in csv format. Data items are identified through their container file 
and their name. For example, Curvatures_Cap!BeginValueCm refers to the variable 
BeginValueCm  in the file Curvatures_Cap.xls (see figure 5). 
 
Fig. 5. Example of data declaration 
 
Supported basic types are INT, BOOL and STRING. Data items are sequences of 
these basic types. Values are extracted from xls files (see figure 6, the positions are 
expressed in centimeters). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Example of data valuation 
 
The verification rules are expressed using the B mathematical language and structured 
as B operations. Instead of having to deal with too large, quantified predicates, a 
verification rule is decomposed in small steps that allow displaying accurate error 
message helping to determine the source of the error.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Example of a verification rule 
 
A rule is composed of one or several COUNTEREXAMPLEs. 
COUNTEREXAMPLEs are evaluated in the order they are defined. Keyword 
COUNTEREXAMPLE is followed by a formatted message (%1, %2, %3, etc. 
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represent the value of the first, second, third parameter of the following ANY 
substitution).  
The ANY substitution allows to filter data or to calculate values. In figure 7, the first 
rule computes the number of couples of the sequence ATC_Equipment_Type whose 
second element is the string “Trackside OMAP”. 
The ANY substitution is followed by an EXPECTED field. If some values of the 
parameters of the ANY substitution satisfy the predicate of that substitution but don’t 
satisfy the predicate of the EXPECTED field, the error message is displayed with its 
parameters instantiated. In figure 7, the error message of the second rule displays the 
value of urbalisSectorID (%1) and nb (%3). 
 
ProB is the central tool for the verification. It has been modified in order to produce a 
file containing all counter examples detected (see figure 5) and slightly improved to 
better support some B keywords. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Example of faulty verification: meaningful messages are generated for all 
counter examples 
 
 
DTVT has been experimented with success on several ongoing developments 
(Mexico, Toronto, Sao Paulo, and Panama) to verify up to 50,000 Excel cells against 
up to 200 rules. A first round allowed defining required concepts, intermediate 
constructs (predicates used by several rules) and formalizing a set of generic rules that 
are shared by all projects. During the next rounds, specific project rules and data files 
were added. A complete verification is performed in about 10 minutes, including the 
verification report. The process is completely automatic and can be replayed without 
any human intervention when data values are modified. 
5 Conclusion 
Data validation appears to be of paramount importance in safety critical systems. The 
results obtained in this domain during the DEPLOY project have allowed to create 
and experiment with success on real scale projects a method for validating data 
against properties, based on the ProB model-checker and constraint solver. 
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A recipe for timed Event-B specifications
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Abstract. We present a novel approach to the description of real-time
requirements in Event-B, based on the relativistic time model of Got-
tfried Liebniz. The approach is surprisingly useful, and has led to some
significant results. We illustrate the approach with several modelling
recipes for the specification of real-time systems in Event-B.
1 Introduction
In the design and modelling of systems from user specifications, it is common to
find some proportion of the user requirements expressed in terms of real-time.
In work on business information systems, for example, real-time requirements
are a natural way to express high-level constraints on business processes [8]. In
scheduling or performance analysis, real-time is the natural language for stating
requirements.
We use the Event-B language [5] to explore an alternative model of time,
the Leibnizian model [11]. According to Leibniz, time is not a fundamental di-
mension, but is used to distinguish the changes in an observed entity. In the
Newtonian model time is an observable attribute of an entity, and may be used
to distinguish an entity in the past from an entity in the future, even if the
entities are otherwise identical. In the Leibnizian model, in which time is not
a directly observable attribute, these may only be distinguished if some other
observable attribute has changed. In other words, in the Leibnizian model, time-
related changes are transformations of the entity itself. If nothing changes, time
is not observed to pass, and therefore (to the observer) time does not pass.
The Newtonian model permits time to change without a change in the observed
entity.
The dichotomy of the Leibnizian model, in which two separate entities are
necessary in order to define the notion of time, suggests that all the time-related
properties may be isolated in the observer part leaving the part being observed
to deal with functional properties. This has important practical implications:
the formulation of timing constraints does not have to be notationally tied with
the description of behaviour so that existing methods, semantics and tools may
be employed in specifying functional properties.
This difference in time interpretation has significant consequences for the
definition of a timed semantics, and for the specification of timing constraints in
Event B. We present the semantic model briefly, using examples to illustrate the
important points. We also give a series of “recipes” to show how the Leibnizian
time model could be used by a model developer to introduce time into Event-B
developments.
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machine M
sees Context
variables v
invariant I(c, s, v)
initialisation SI(c, s, v
′)
events
e = any p where Ge(c, s, p, v) then Se(c, s, p, v, v
′) end
. . .
end
Fig. 1. Event-B model structure.
2 Background
An Event-B development starts with a compact, often trivial abstraction. The
cornerstone of the Event-B method is a stepwise development that facilitates
a gradual design of a complex system via a number of correctness-preserving
refinement steps. The general form of an Event-B model (or machine) is shown
in Fig. 1. A machine encapsulates a state space, defined by machine variables,
and provides transitions on the state, as described by machine events. Events
are characterised by a list of parameters p, a state predicate G called an event
guard, and a next-state relation S.
The invariant clause defines the properties of a system, expressed as state
predicates, that must be preserved during the system lifitem. The states defined
by an invariant are called the safe states of a system. A correct model is proven
to never leave its safe states. Data types s, constants c and relevant axioms are
defined in a separate component called a context, and included into a machine
with the sees clause.
The consistency of a machine as well as the correctness of refinement steps is
demonstrated by discharging relevant proof obligations which, collectively, define
the Event-B proof semantics [5]. The Rodin Platform [18], a tool supporting
Event-B, is an integrated environment that automatically generates necessary
proof obligations and providers a number of automated provers and solvers along
with an interactive proof environment.
An Event-B machine defines a state transition system. Let Ω = {v | I(c, s, v)}
be the (safe) states of a machine where v and I(c, s, v) are the variables and the
invariant of a machine. The relational form of an event e is [e]R ≡ {v 7→ v′ |
∃p · (Ge(c, s, p, v) ∧ Se(c, s, p, v, v′))}.
Definition 1 (Event-B transition system). A machine defines a transition
system (Ω, f, ω0) where f : Ω→P(Ω) is defined as f = (
⋃
e[e]R); the set of initial
states ω0 ⊆ Ω is defined by the initialisation predicate SI : ω0 = {v′ | SI(c, s, v′)}.
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3 Leibnizian Time
In this section we formally define some essential concepts of the Leibnizian time
model. We illustrate them with a timed specification of a lossless buffer, which
we return to throughout the paper. For brevity, we omit the theorem proofs.
Proofs and machine-checked models of the example are available at [3].
A fundamental concept is that of a process, which we define as a transition
system.
Definition 2 (Process). A process P is a tuple (αP, p, ιP) where αP is a pro-
cess alphabet, p ⊂ αP × αP is a transition relation and ιP is the set of initial
states.
Time only appears when we put together two processes and let them interact in
a certain way. The nature of the interaction is what intuitively may be regarded
as an observation of one process by another.
Definition 3 (Observation connection). An observation connection between
processes C and S is a relation ϕ ⊆ αS× αC.
A timed system is formed of pair of processes where one process, an observer,
is said to observe another process, a subject. In the definition above, C is an
observer and S is a subject.
Definition 4 (Timed system). An observer process C, a subject process S and
an observation connection ϕ define a timed system C · ϕ · S.
The first technique we give extends an untimed Event-B model to a timed system,
by defining a timed observer in an associated context. We illustrate this technique
in Example 1.
Recipe 1 (Event-B timed system) An timed Event-B system C · ϕ · S is a
pair of a machine S and context C of the following form.
machine S
sees C
variables v
invariant I(V )
initialisation R(v′)
events
Ei = any pi where
Gi(pi, v)
then
Si(pi, v, v
′)
end
end
context C
sets αC
constants c, ϕ, ιC
axioms
ιC ⊆ αC
c ⊆ αC× αC
ϕ ⊆ {v | I(v)} × αC
. . .
end
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Subject S is an arbitrary Event-B machine defining a vector of variables v. Set
{v | I(v)} defines the possible states of the machine. Observer C is axiomatically
defined in a context. The context defines a sort αC, a transition relation c and
an observation connection ϕ which relates states from set {v | I(v)} to observer
states. Further axioms and theorems may added, to more precisely characterise
the observer model. ¤
Example 1 (Buffer). A lossy buffer with the capacity to store one element of
type V is defined by machine BUF, as shown below.
machine BUF
sees def ,C0
variables b
invariant b ∈ V
initialisation b :∈ V
events
wr = any v where
v ∈ V 1
then
b := v
end
rd = begin b := nil end
end
context C0
ιC0 = V
c ⊆ V × V \ (V 1× V 1)
ϕ = V C id
end
The constant nil ∈ V and sets V 1 = V \ {nil}, V 1 6= ∅ are defined in context
def . Event wr updates the value of the stored element; event rd consumes a
buffered element and sets the buffer contents to nil to indicate that the buffer
is now empty. The events are always enabled and thus BUF permits arbitrary
interleavings of the operations. Such operations may be implemented by unsyn-
chronised concurrent activities. The write operation may happen arbitrary often
thus potentially overwriting a previous value before it is read.
A lossless buffer is defined with the following timed Event-B system.
C0 · ϕ · BUF
The observation model rules out the possibility of event wr writing into a non-
empty buffer. We shall substantiate this claim in Example 2. ¤
An interpretation of a timed system gives a precise meaning to the phe-
nomenon of observation. Essentially, an observation prohibits behaviours that
an observer does not expect to see.
Definition 5 (Interpretation of a timed system). Given a timed system
C · ϕ · S where S = (αS, s, ιS) and C = (αC, c, ιC), its interpretation is a process
I(C · ϕ · S) ≡ (ϕ, τ(C · ϕ · S), (ιS× ιC) ∩ ϕ)
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where transition relation τ(C · ϕ · S) ⊆ (αS × αC) × (αS × αC) is such that a
mapping (u 7→ t) 7→ (u′ 7→ t′) ∈ (αS× αC)× (αS× αC) belongs to τ(C · ϕ · S) if
and only if the following properties hold
(a) u 7→ u′ ∈ s (a transition of a subject process)
(b) t 7→ t′ ∈ c (a transition of an observer process)
(c) u 7→ t, u′ 7→ t′ ∈ ϕ (subject and observer transitions are linked via the
observation connection)
One could say that an observer is a historian with a preconceived idea about
subject process behaviour. An observer would not tolerate a subject that does
not follow a certain plan or timetable. Note the use of ϕ ⊆ αS×αC to define the
alphabet of a timed system interpretation. Whenever we speak about a timed
system we always imply, unless specifically indicated otherwise, that the timed
system permits an interpretation.
It is essential to note that (despite the nomenclature) the observer is an
integral part of the timed system, and does not have a merely passive role. The
observer characterises the timing constraints that the developer wishes to impose
on an otherwise untimed system, and permits only interpretations that conform
to these constraints.
Recipe 2 (Consistency) It may happen that a proof of liveness and timing
properties is merely a consequence of an incompatibility between the observer
and the subject process. This incompatibility results in a vacuous interpretation
of a timed system that defines no common state transitions. To avoid this prob-
lem, it is sufficient to exhibit an initialisation of the timed system. For a timed
system C · ϕ · S one needs to prove that
∃x, y · x 7→ y ∈ ιS× ιC ∧ x 7→ y ∈ ϕ (1)
Condition 1 is called the consistency proof obligation of a timed system. ¤
The consistency condition holds for the system in Example 1; one possible
witness is mapping nil 7→ nil.
We give now the condition under which an event may be safely removed from
a timed system without affecting the overall behaviour.
Recipe 3 (Relation empty) Consider a timed system C ·ϕ · S with Event-B
machine S defining some event Ei :
Ei = any pi where Gi(pi, v) then Si(pi, v, v
′) end
Let S′ be a machine identical to S except that Ei is suppressed:
Ei = any pi where ⊥ then Si(pi, v, v′) end
Timed systems C·ϕ·S and C·ϕ·S′ are equivalent provided the following condition
is satisfied
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(ϕ[before(Ei)]× ϕ[after(Ei)]) ∩ c = ∅ (2)
where before(e) corresponds to the enabling states defined by an event guard
and after(e) is a set of possible new states computed by an event:
before(e) = {v | I(v) ∧ ∃pi · Gi(pi, v)}
after(e) = {v′ | I(v) ∧ ∃pi · (Gi(pi, v) ∧ Si(pi, v, v
′))}
The technique allows one to prove that after removing event Ei the overall
timed system does not become less live since the Ei is already prevented from
occuring by an observer.
Example 2 (Buffer, contd.). We can apply the event removal technique to prove
that timed system C0 · ϕ · BUF from Example 1 does indeed define a lossless
buffer.
To make the buffer lossless, we need to rule out the posibility of event wr
writing into a non-empty buffer. That is, event wr should not happen when
b 6= nil. Event wr may be represented (via a trivial case of refinement) by the
following two events.
wr = refines wr any v where b = nil ∧ v ∈ V 1 then b := v end
owr = refines wr any v where b 6= nil ∧ v ∈ V 1 then b := v end
It is possible to prove that owr is not a part of the timed system C0 ·ϕ ·BUF by
showing that Condition 2 holds for owr :
(ϕ[before(owr)]× ϕ[after(owr)]) ∩ c = ∅
which expands to ϕ[{b | b ∈ V 1 ∧ (∃v · v ∈ V 1)}] × ϕ[{b′ | b ∈ V 1 ∧ (∃v · v ∈
V 1 ∧ b′ = v)}] ∩ c = ∅. Since V 1 is not empty we have that ∃v · v ∈ V 1⇔>
and also V 1 = {b | b ∈ V 1}. The condition simplifies to ϕ[V 1] × ϕ[V 1] ∩ c =
∅ ⇔ ϕ[V 1] × ϕ[V 1] ∩ (V × V \ (V 1 × V 1)) = ∅ ⇔ >. Hence, we can replace
machine BUF in C0 · ϕ · BUF with the following machine BUF′:
machine BUF′
. . .
events
wr = any v where b = nil ∧ v ∈ V 1 then b := v end
rd = begin b := nil end
end
It is trivial to see that BUF′ defines a lossless buffer. Hence, C0 · ϕ · BUF is
also a lossless buffer. ¤
It is often advantageous to deal with an observer that is cooperative enough
to completely accept any execution of a subject process. Then one knows a
priori that something happens in a subject process for every possible point of
time defined by an observer.
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Definition 6 (Strictness). A timed system A = (αC, c, ιC) · ϕ · (αS, s, ιS) is
strict if for every u 7→ t ∈ αS×αC and t 7→ t′ ∈ c there exists some u′ such that
(u 7→ t) 7→ (u′ 7→ t′) ∈ τA and ιC ⊆ ϕ[ιS].
In a system with a strict observer, an observation connection is also a simulation
relation [3].
Example 3 (Buffer, contd.). Observer C0 permits a concise abstraction however
there is an even simpler observer that achieves the same effect. Notice that
C0 · ϕ · BUF defines three transitions classes: reading a value and setting buffer
to 0 (V +×{nil}); reading an empty buffer ({nil 7→ nil}); writing into an empty
buffer ({nil}×V +). We shall exploit this property and define a new observer C1
such that these three classes are the kernels of new observation connection ϕ1:
context C1
extends def
sets αC1
constants c1, ϕ1, ιC1,E,F
axioms
partition(αC1, {E,F})
ιC1 = {E,F}
c1 = {E 7→ E,E 7→ F,F 7→ E}
ϕ1 = V 1× {F} ∪ {nil}× {E}
end
It is not hard to see that event removal condition also holds for C1 · ϕ1 · BUF:
ϕ1[before(owr)]×ϕ1[after(owr)]∩ c1 = ∅⇔ ({F}×{F})∩ c1 = ∅⇔>. It is easy
to see that, unlike C0 · ϕ · BUF, system C1 · ϕ1 · BUF is strict. ¤
The fourth recipe allows a developer to show that a state which is possible in
the untimed process is ruled out by the timing constraints. We give the theory
of the technique and demonstrate it with a simple example.
Recipe 4 (Point empty) Consider a timed system C ·ϕ ·S and a subject state
w ∈ αS. If one can show that ϕ does not project w into anything at all in αC
then, by the Definition 5 of timed system interpretation, any state χ ∈ αC×αS
where prj2[{χ}] = {w} is not a state of C · ϕ · S.
Thus, a subject state not projected by ϕ is not reachable in a timed system.
A proof that assumes the existence of such a state may be discharged by deriving
a contradiction with the following rule.
∀W ·W ⊆ Ω ∧ ϕ[W ] = ∅⇒⊥ (3)
where Ω = {v | I(v)} is the set of subject states. ¤
Example 4 (Mutex). In this example we describe a very simple mutual exclusion
algorithm that works due to a rigid scheduling of the involved threads. The state
of a thread p is defined by s(p) and is one of the following values: ’out’, denoting
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that p is outside of a critical section and not trying to enter it; ’prep’, telling
that the thread is about to enter the critical section; and ’in’ for the states when
the thread is in the critical section.
machine MTX
variables s
invariant
inv1 : s ∈ P →{out,prep, in}
inv2 : card(s−1[{in}]) ≤ 1
initialisation s := P × {out}
events
prepare = any p where p ∈ P ∧ s(p) = out then s(p) := prep end
enter = any p where p ∈ P ∧ s(p) = prep then s(p) := in end
leave = any p where p ∈ P ∧ s(p) = in then s(p) := out end
end
where set P of processes is finite. Invariant inv2 expresses the property of mu-
tual exclusion. We employ the following observer process to define that no two
processes may be, at the same time, at stages ’prep’ and ’in’:
context C
. . .
c ⊆ αC× αC
S = P(P × {out,prep, in})
ϕ ⊆ S × αC
axm5 : ∀t, q · t, q ∈ P ∧ t 6= q⇒ Ja(t) = prep ∧ a(q) = inK = ∅
end
where JP (ω)K ≡ ϕ[{ω | P (ω)}]. The only non-trivial proof obligation in this
model is the preservation of inv2 by event enter . It asks to prove, for some
process p, that entering the critical does not violate safety invariant inv2.
card(s−1[{in}]) ≤ 1 ∧ s(p) = prep ² card((sC− {p 7→ in})−1[{in}]) ≤ 1
The condition cannot be discharged within the scope of the subject model alone.
We need to bring in the constraints of the observer model to demonstrate the
condition. We proceed by replacing card((s C− {p 7→ in})−1[{in}]) ≤ 1 with a
stronger goal s−1[{in}] = ∅ and continue with a proof by contradiction. The
negation of s−1[{in}] = ∅ in hypothesis gives
s(p) = prep ∧ s(x) = in ∧ x 6= p ² ⊥
A state where one process is in the critical section and the other is about to
enter the critical section is disallowed by the observer (axm5) so that the point
empty technique may be used to discharge the condition. Instantiating axm5
with t = p, q = x we have ϕ[{a · a ∈ S ∧ a(p) = prep ∧ a(x) = in | a}] = ∅
which gives us set W to instantiate Condition 3 and derive a contradiction in
hypothesis.
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One way to realise observer C is by defining it to be cyclic scheduler that
allows processes to access the critical section at fixed time intervals. ¤
Recipe 5 (Point merge) This technique is a generalisation of the empty point
technique. It is used to derive a contradiction when a subject state, defined by
the intersection of states of two or more concurrent threads disgrees with the
observation model. The following lemma states how to make a transition from
a set of statements about individual thread states to a statement about a time
point when such a state configuration may be observed.
Lemma 1 (Point merge). Let W and Pi be non-empty subject process states
such that W = {v | W (v)}, Pi = {v | Pi(v)} where W (v) and Pi(v) are predicates
over subject process state space and it holds that W ⇒ ∧i Pi. Then there exist
time points ti ∈ JPiK ∩ JW K such that ∀i, j · ti = tj.
Proof. See [3] (a Rodin Toolkit proof).
The proof technique is to show that no two states from Pi and Pj , i 6= j may be
observed at the same time (due to some timing conditions). Then the existence
of a time point common for the two states Pi and Pj gives a contradiction.
We have applied the point merge technique in the proof of Fischer’s timing-
based algorithm of mutual exclusion [19, 4]. The complete Event-B development
of the algorithm is available at [2]. ¤
4 Discussion
We have presented a summary of our ideas on how the Leibnizian model of time
may be used to construct timed Event-B specifications. Our approach offers a
homogenous technique to time modelling where properties of timed models are
expressed and proven in a gradual, refinement-based manner. The approach is
a conservative extension of Event-B. No notational or semantical changes are
necessary and the existing modelling tools have proven adequate.
Our technique does not dictate any specific time domain: we let a modeller
choose the most appropriate abstraction of time – a simple scheduler, a fictious
integer clock or a dense time clock. Both dense and discrete time domains are
supported so that the approach may be used as a part of a toolchain with a wide
range of potential roles including expressing scheduling properties and hard real-
time constraints. The approach has proven to be quite effecient and intuitive:
we were able to tackle several large case studies and, as far as we are aware,
our models are simpler and require a lower verification effort while all proofs are
completely machine-checked.
Due to space constraints, we did not present a larger case study although
one such case study is available at [2]. Many recipes were not discussed. These
include rules for demonstrating the realisability of a timed specification and
several refinement-related recipes. We plan to provide a plug-in to the Rodin
Toolkit [18] for automated generation of the timed systems proof obligations and
a template-based assistant for constructing various kinds of observer processes.
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Dependability-Explicit Engineering with
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Abstract. Event-B has been actively used within the EU Deploy project
to model dependable systems from various application domains. As a re-
sult, we have created a number of formal approaches to explicitly reason
about dependability in the refinement process. In this paper we overview
the work on formal engineering of dependable systems carried out in the
Deploy project. We outline our approaches to integrating safety analysis
into the development process, modelling fault tolerant systems and prob-
abilistic dependability evaluation. We discuss achievements and chal-
lenges in development of dependable systems within the Event-B frame-
work.
Keywords: Formal modelling, dependability, safety, fault tolerance, Event-
B, refinement, probabilistic verification.
1 Introduction
Nowadays we tend to place increasing reliance on computer-based systems and
software which they are running. The degree of reliance that we can justifiably
place on a system is expressed by the notion of dependability [1]. However, the
analysis of recent software-caused accidents has shown that the current devel-
opment process is inadequate for achieving high degree of dependability. While
a number of existing methods and tools address certain aspects of dependable
systems development, there is still a lack of a general viable dependability-explicit
techniques for developing software for complex systems.
To address this issue, in the FP7 EU Deploy project [2] we have proposed a
number of approaches that allow the designers to explicitly address dependabil-
ity throughout the entire system development by refinement in Event-B [3]. In
this paper we briefly overview the approaches that have been mainly proposed
by the researchers from A˚bo Akademi University. The goal of this paper is to
present some evidences that Event-B consitutes a suitable framework for formal
dependability-explicit development.
2 Engineering Dependable Systems with Event-B
2.1 Event-B
Currently, complexity is perceived as the main threat to dependability. To cope
with the system complexity, we need scalable formal techniques to explicitly
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address various dependability aspects throughout the entire development cycle.
It is widely recognised that system complexity can be managed via abstract
modelling, decomposition and iterative development. Event-B [3] is a formal
top-down development approach to correct-by-construction system development.
Development in Event-B starts from defining a high-level specification that rep-
resents the system behavior and properties in a highly abstract way. The main
development technique – refinement – allows us to ensure that a concrete specifi-
cation preserves the globally observable behaviour and properties of the abstract
specification, i.e., verify correctness with respect to the abstract specification.
Verification of each refinement step is done by proofs. The Rodin platform [4]
automates modelling and verification in Event-B.
2.2 Dependability in System Development
The notion of dependability encompasses a wide range of system properties.
Traditionally, dependability can by characterised by such attributes [1] as reli-
ability, safety, availability, maintainability, confidentiality and integrity. In the
Deploy project, the main focus has been on developing techniques addressing
safety, reliability and availability.
The system dependability is impaired by failures, errors and faults [1]. To
break the chain of propagation of a fault – a physical defect or malfunction of a
system component – towards the system boundary, the system designers employ
a variety of techniques to avoid and remove faults, as well as tolerate and forecast
them. Let us now discuss the ways in which Event-B facilitates development of
dependable systems.
The main purpose of fault prevention (or fault avoidance) techniques is to
avoid occurrence or introduction of faults during the development process. De-
velopment in Event-B allows the designers to better understand the system re-
quirements and properties and express them in precise mathematical way. The
verification that proceeds hand-in-hand with the modelling enables early identi-
fication of design errors and avoid dependability-impairing failures.
Fault tolerance methods are used to design a system in such a way that it
is capable of functioning despite the presence of faults. While specifying fault
tolerant systems in Event-B, we model not only nominal system behaviour but
also failure occurrence and fault tolerance as an intrinsic part of the system
specification. It allows us to formally underpin fault assumptions and rigorously
define fault tolerance mechanisms.
Fault removal is a set of techniques for identifying and removing the causes
of errors. The fault removal process at the development stage starts with system
verification, which is followed by diagnosis and correction steps. While mod-
elling systems in Event-B, we rely on proofs, probabilistic extension of Event-B
and associated probabilistic model checking to verify correctness of functional
behaviour and satisfaction of the desired dependability attributes.
Fault forecasting aims at evaluation of the impact of fault occurrence and ac-
tivation on the system behaviour. Such an evaluation has qualitative and quan-
titative aspects. The qualitative analysis helps to designate and classify failure
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modes as well as identify combinations of faults of components that may po-
tentially lead to a system failure. We have demonstrated that how a seamless
integration between Event-B and various techniques for safety analysis facilitate
qualitative assessment of the impact of faults on the system dependability. The
probabilistic extension of Event-B allows for the quantitative assessment of to
what extent certain attributes of dependability are satisfied.
Therefore, we believe that Event-B constitutes a suitable and versatile frame-
work for creating a rigorous dependability-explicit development process. Next we
overview in a more details our contributions to attaining establishing dependability-
explicit development process with Event-B.
3 Formal development of fault tolerant mode-rich
systems
A widely used mechanism for achieving fault tolerance is based on the notion of
modes. In our work [10–12], we have proposed an approach to formal develop-
ment of fault tolerant mode-rich systems. Such systems achieve fault tolerance
by rollbacking to specific degraded modes. The proposed formal development
process allows the designers to develop a system in a layered fashion. Essen-
tially, it consists of a number of steps gradually unfolding system architectural
layers by refinement. Moreover, we prove the consistency between mode transi-
tions on adjacent architectural layers, which significantly improves scalability of
verification. It has been noted that testing and model checking of the systems
with complex mode transition schemes suffers from poor scalability. We have
overcame this problem by relying on incremental verification of global mode
consistency properties by proof and hence achieved a good scalability.
In our approach to modelling mode-rich systems [10–12], we have focused on
verification of consistency of a predefined mode logic. In [13], we have proposed
to conduct Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of each operational
mode to identify mode transitions required to implement fault tolerance. Fault
tolerance is achieved by two different means – transitions to a more degraded
mode and dynamic reconfiguration using redundant components. Furthermore,
we have investigated a complex interplay between the states of components dur-
ing reconfiguration and the system modes.
4 Goal-oriented refinement of reconfigurable systems
In [5, 6, 17], we have investigated the problem of ensuring safety and fault toler-
ance of mobile agent systems. The work has resulted in defining the modelling
patterns to represent agent roles in dynamic scopes and deriving the logical
conditions to ensure system dependability.
In [7], we have continued our study of multi-agent systems and have proposed
a goal-oriented approach to development of multi-agent systems. It is currently
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recognized that the goal-oriented development facilitates design of complex dy-
namically adaptable systems. In goal-oriented development the system require-
ments are defined in terms of goals – the functional and non-functional objectives
that a system should achieve. Often changes in system operational environment,
e.g., caused by failures of agents – independent system components of various
types – might hinder achieving the desired goals. In [ADA] we have proposed a
formal development approach that ensures goal reachability ”by construction”.
Essentially, our approach allows the developers to define system goals at differ-
ent levels of abstraction and guarantee goal reachability despite agent failures.
We have derived refinement patterns modelling the mechanisms for dynamic
system reconfiguration by reallocating goals from failed agents to healthy ones
and, per se, guarantee dependability. We believe that our approach offers a scal-
able technique for formal development of dynamically reconfigurable dependable
systems.
While refining a reconfigurable system, we had to assume that sufficient
amount of agents would remain operational to achieve the desired goals. In [8],
we have demonstrated how to integrate probabilistic analysis to quantitatively
assess the likelihood of goal reachability despite failures. The rigorous refinement
process has allowed us to establish the precise relationships between component
failures and goal reachability. We have assessed the derived reconfigurable sys-
tem architecture to quantitatively verify that it achieves the desired reliability
and performance objectives. This was accomplished by relying on the probabilis-
tic extension of Event-B to verify reliability and performance properties using
PRISM model checker [9].
5 Integrating Safety Analysis into Formal Development
In [14], we have demonstrated how to combine formal modelling and refinement
with Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). We have defined a set of pat-
terns formalising the requirements derived from FMEA as well as automated
their integration into the formal specification. The proposed approach facilitates
formal development and improves traceability of safety requirements. The ap-
proach proposed in this paper allows us to automate the formal development
process via two main steps: choice of suitable patterns that generically define
FMEA result, and instantiation of chosen patterns with model-specific infor-
mation. Our approach allows the developers to verify (by proofs) that safety
invariants are preserved in spite of identified component failure modes. Hence
we believe that it provides a useful support for formal development and improves
traceability of safety requirements.
The use of an evidence generated from formal analysis is still an open issue
in the system certification process. Sometimes the formal proofs deemed to be
too complex and cause doubts regarding their trustworthiness as the evidence in
safety cases of safety-critical systems. Another open issue related to the formal
modelling process is whether the obtained formal model adequately represents
safety requirements described in a system specification. In our work[18] we pro-
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posed an approach to linking formal modelling in Event-B with safety cases.
We give the classification of safety requirements and define how each class can
be represented in a formal specification. The approach allows the developers to
obtain a consistent system specification that facilitate deriving a sufficient safety
case.
The systems, whose components are susceptible to various kinds of faults,
never are ”absolutely” safe, i.e., certain combinations of failures may lead to
an occurrence of a hazard – a potentially dangerous situation breaching safety
requirements. To demonstrate that the probability of a hazard occurrence is ac-
ceptably low, in [15] we have presented a formal approach to integrating quanti-
tative safety analysis into formal system development by refinement in Event-B.
Essentially, our approach can be seen as a process of extracting a fault tree –
a logical representation of a hazardous situation in terms of the primitives used
at different abstraction layers. Eventually, we arrive at the representation of a
hazard in terms of the failures of basic system components, which allows us to
calculate probability of a hazard occurrence. The proposed approach is based
on a probabilistic extension of Event-B [16]. It enables development of systems
that are not only correct but also safe by construction.
6 Quantitative Assessment of Dependability
To facilitate dependability-explicit development in the probabilistic Event-B [16],
we strengthened the notion of Event-B refinement by requiring that a refined
model, besides being a proper functional refinement of its more abstract counter-
part, also satisfies a number of quantitative constraints. These constraints ensure
that the refined model improves (or at least preserves) the current probabilis-
tic measures of system dependability attributes. In our work, these additional
constraints are usually derived from the fundamental properties of Markov pro-
cesses. To validate the proposed approaches, in Deploy we have conducted a
number of case studies including formal development and quantitative assess-
ment of a fault tolerant satellite system, formal modelling integrated with safety
analysis of a radio-based railway crossing controller, service-oriented system etc.
This work allows the designers to to evaluate the impact of the chosen design
decisions on system dependability.
7 Discussion
Our work on formal engineering of dependable systems in the EU Deploy project
has resulted in two types of approaches:
– the approaches that focus on creating modelling patterns and guidelines for
representing and verifying certain resilience-related behavior
– the approaches that integrate (external) techniques for safety and reliability
analysis into the formal development process of Event-B.
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A tight cooperation with the Deploy industrial partners has allowed us to gain
rich experience in modelling dependable systems from the transportation, aerospace
and business information system domains. The development of industrial-scale
systems has emphasized the need for scalability in formal modelling and au-
tomatic tool support. It has fostered the research on modularisation and de-
composition techniques for Event-B as well as development of various plug-ins.
Moreover, it has led to understanding importance of heterogenous modelling
techniques to address a variety of dependability aspects.
In general, we believe that Event-B offers a powerful formal technique for
engineering dependable systems. To leverage scalability and industrial relevance
of the method, we will continue to enlarge the set of modelling patterns for rep-
resenting various dependability aspects, strengthening automatic tool support
and enriching its capabilities via dedicated plug-ins to the Rodin platform.
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Abstract
This article presents a verification and validation activity performed in an industrial context, to
validate configuration data of a metro CBTC system by creating a formal B model of these configuration
data and of their properties. A double tool chain is used to safely check whether a certain given input
of configuration data fulfill its properties. One tool is based on some Rodin and open source plug-ins
and the other tool is based on ProB.
1 Data configuration of CBTC
A Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) is a system used to safely control metro systems. It
allows several train control modes including a fully automatic mode. It must achieve high safety-
critical and high availability levels defined in the CENELEC standards (EN 50126 [5], EN 50128 [6], EN
50129 [7]).
A CBTC system comes with a lot of configuration data because these data should describe a large
part of the metro railway network. Much equipment of the CBTC should be parametrized with these
configuration data. Each piece of equipment typically uses from a few kilo-bytes to one or more mega-
bytes of data.
Pieces of CBTC equipment are controlled by software parametrized by configuration data. Al-
though the process presented here could be applied on both safety-critical and non safety-critical parts,
it is only applied on safety-critical parts in order to reduce development costs. Safety-critical software is
developed independently from its configuration data, thus a software version has to be validated only
once, even if it is instantiated for several pieces of equipment. It also does not have to be validated
again after some configuration data change. The data properties as required by a piece of software, are
described as requirements in the software interface document. Every set of configuration data also has
to be validated once.
For the CBTC system under development, this principle of separation between software and con-
figuration data is taken to the extreme, since configuration data are not built-in into equipment, they
are instead dynamically loaded at runtime through configuration messages.
Although configuration data are just built to parametrize some equipment, these data may be par-
tial: each piece of equipment needs only access to its own specific data subset, otherwise some data
can be shared beetween several pieces of equipment. So the development process of configuration data
starts by developing a common database of configuration data representing the whole CBTC system.
This database should have no or very low redundancy.
2 Validation of configuration data
To validate configuration data we build a B model of the configuration data and of their properties
with basic B types and predicates. Then, given an input set of configuration data we use a double tool
chain to evaluate all the predicates for these configuration data.
The process of validating configuration data is split into two major activities:
• the preparation phase which consists in modelling data and their properties and then verifying
and testing the model,
1
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Figure 1: Validation process
• the actual validation of a given configuration data set against the obtained model.
The preparation activity takes by far the most time, whereas the actual validation is more about
setting everything up and then running automated tools.
2.1 The real database
In one case, data are given in the XML format derived from a UML model. XML is well-suited to be
interfaced with the predicates evaluation tools.1
However, it is necessary to model and access data from binary messages derived from the XML
database, because these messages contain the actual configuration data that are loaded into safety-
critical equipment of the CBTC system.
Interfacing predicate evaluation tools directly with binary structures is not recommended, since it
would depend too much on a particular binary structure and would be difficult to maintain. It has been
decided to develop a tool to convert a binary structure into an XML file. To deal with safety issues, a
reverse tool has also been independently developed to convert back the XML file into a binary file. To
ensure that the binary/XML converter works fine, we apply the reverse XML/binary converter and
check that the result is the same as the binary file we started from.
2.2 Modelling interface constants
The preparation activity starts by interfacing the data of the real database with B constants, which will
provide the basic bricks of the formal model.
The following types2 of constants can be declared as basic interface constants to link elements of
the real database to constants of the B properties:
• carrier sets,
• subsets of carrier sets,
• scalar data (mostly integers),
• functions from a scalar type to another scalar type,
• relations between a scalar type and another scalar type,
• functions from a scalar type to functions from a scalar type into another scalar type.
For all these cases, a constant is given by its name, a typing predicate in the B language (except for
carrier sets as they define new scalar types) and an XPath request. When these requests are placed on
some XML file, they select one value, or a set of values. In the case of functions and relations, several
1Our approach can be adapted to other classical database interfaces like SQL, excel,...
2Usually two-dimensional functions are enough to model everything we need from the real configuration database.
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XPath requests are required, to select first a domain element, and then to select a range element. And
in the case of a function of functions three XPath requests are required, two for the domain and one for
the range.
Carrier sets are used to define every distinct type of objects handled in the database, such as lines,
sections, blocks, block frontiers, track circuits, switches, signals (traffic lights), beacons, etc. In a CBTC
system, a block is an elementary linear part of a railroad which defines a local one dimension coordinate
system oriented by its two frontiers. By definition, the origin frontier is located at abscissa 0 and the
destination frontier is located at abscissa block length.
SETS
t_block;
t_block_frontier
Scalar data are used to define constant numbers of the system, such as special distances, speeds,
accelerations, delays.
Functions and relations are used to define links between objects, such as the length of a block, the
block a signal is located on, the signal abscissa, the blocks that follow a given block in a given direction.
Functions and relations are the most common building units handled by the model.
The following interface constants represent the block frontier located at the origin or at the destina-
tion of a block. Destination and origin define the block orientation.
f_block_orig ∈ t_block→ t_block_frontier∧
f_block_dest ∈ t_block→ t_block_frontier
These interface constants do not have to be a straightforward copy of the real database that could
be produced automatically. They are the first step of the model and should be the result of modelling
choices in order to make the model as simple and as effective as possible to express properties. For
instance, in the XML database a signal has an enumerated attribute to state its type between manoeuvre
signal, spacing signal, or permanent signal. Keeping this attribute is something to do at a programming
language level. In a set-theoretic model, we prefer to define constant subsets for each type of signal.
Concerning floating point values, we reach a limitation of the B Language, which only supports
integers, so we use only fixed point integers isomorphic to integers in trivial way. The XML database
contains floating point values. The conversion to integers can be done with XPath operators.
2.3 Modelling useful expressions
The second modelling step consists in building a library of useful formal expressions which will serve
as building blocks for the whole model. These intermediate useful expressions are called definitions,
they are similar to a LET in software-B. A definition is associated with a name, an informal description,
and a B expression.
Although interface constants provide a certain flexibility, they may be too limited to define directly
the data structures best suited to model properties. For instance, interface constant functions are lim-
ited to two-dimensional functions. Definitions based on interface constants are used to define the
constants we really want for the B model.
Thanks to the definitions, the B model is easier to read, to understand and to verify. This breaking
down mechanism into many intermediate steps does really work fine and does not come with any
downside, so it may be used intensively. Especially, there is no limitation on the number of nested
definitions used in a B model and the tools do not have any specific time efficiency issues due to nested
definitions.
For the CBTC under development, a library of definitions was used to model graph functions. In-
deed, a CBTC railway network is represented by an oriented graph of blocks. The following properties
hold on blocks:
• A block has two frontiers noted up and down.
• The down frontier is located at the origin of the block at abscissa 0 and the up frontier is located
at the destination of the block at abscissa block length.
• A block frontier may be connected to no other block, to one block, or to two blocks if there is a
switch at this block frontier and if the block is at the narrow end of the switch. In the latter case,
the two following blocks are called left block and right block depending on their position for an
observer located on the narrow end and facing the switch point.
The four constants below represent the possible next block connected to a block depending on the
direction (upward/downward) and the possible turning direction (left/right).
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f_next_upward_left_block ∈ t_block 7→ t_block∧
f_next_downward_right_block ∈ t_block 7→ t_block∧
f_next_upward_right_block ∈ t_block 7→ t_block∧
f_next_downward_left_block ∈ t_block 7→ t_block
These functions are partial functions which allows to take account of the case where there is no
following block (a convention then fixes the direction which gives the next block).
We define the relation of the possible next block in a direction (upward/downward) this way:
r_next_upward_block = f_next_upward_left_block∪ f_next_upward_right_block∧
r_next_downward_block = f_next_downward_left_block∪ f_next_downward_right_block
The railway graph is then modelled by a relation associating an oriented block with every oriented
block it is connected to. The fact that block orientation is arbitrary, meaning that a block oriented
in a direction may be followed in this direction by a block oriented in the opposite direction makes
the model more complex. However this is required to model correctly all possible railway network
topologies.
Then we define the relation that associates to a block and a direction, each next block in the corre-
sponding direction:
r_next_block =
((r_next_upward_block∩ (f_block_dest ; f_block_origin−1)) ‖ {c_upward 7→ c_upward})∪
((r_next_upward_block∩ (f_block_dest ; f_block_dest−1)) ‖ {c_upward 7→ c_downward})∪
((r_next_upward_block∩ (f_block_origin ; f_block_dest−1)) ‖ {c_downward 7→ c_downward})∪
((r_next_upward_block∩ (f_block_origin ; f_block_origin−1)) ‖ {c_downward 7→ c_upward})
Then, we build a library of functions dealing with this oriented graph. Some ordering functions
define whether a position given by an abscissa on a block is located after another given position, with
respects to a certain direction. They all use the iterate operator on the relation graph. Several ordering
functions are defined depending on which block direction is used as the reference direction.
We define the relation that associates to a block and a direction, every downstream blocks in the
corresponding direction:
r_block_chain = closure1(r_next_block)
The following function states whether a position 2 is located afterwards a position 1 in a given
direction related to the orientation on block 1.
f_pos_afterwards =
%dir1 7→ block1 7→ abs1 7→ block2 7→ abs2· (dir1 ∈ t_dir∧
block1 ∈ t_block∧
abs1 ∈ INTEGER∧
block2 ∈ t_block∧
abs2 ∈ INTEGER|
bool( (block1 = block2
⇒
{c_downward 7→ bool(abs2 ≤ abs1),
c_upward 7→ bool(abs1 ≤ abs2)}(dir1) = TRUE)∧
(block1 6= block2
⇒
∃dir2·( dir2 ∈ t_dir∧
(block1 7→ dir1) 7→ (block2 7→ dir2) ∈ r_block_chain))))
Many properties deal with distances on the railway graph. Although these properties seem straight-
forward in natural language, they are actually more complex than expected to handle, because there
could be several paths between two positions. To handle distances, we define a zone, which is a graph
sub-part, and we define library functions giving the zone obtained by starting from a direction and
moving on to a certain maximum distance. Several functions are defined to suit all the properties
dealing with distances.
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2.4 Modelling properties
Every property requirement on configuration data coming from the relevant documents produced dur-
ing system design should be modelled by a predicate, which is the last step of creating the B model.
Every property is given a name, the design requirement it refers to, a predicate and a natural language
description of the predicate. The requirement tag is used to build traceability tables in order to ensure
that all requirements were properly processed.
Predicates should not be too complex to be easily verified. To do so, definitions should be used
intensively. Actually, the production of definitions is partly done bottom-up, from interface constants
to properties, and partly top-down, from properties to interface constants and partly by means of
refactoring when we realise afterwards how to build a better model.
The following predicate corresponds to the requirement: position protected by a signal is located after-
wards the signal regarding the signal direction.
∀mansig·(mansig ∈ s_mansig ⇒
f_pos_afterwards(f_sig_dir(mansig) 7→ f_sig_block(mansig) 7→
f_sig_abs(mansig) 7→
f_sig_prot_seg(mansig) 7→
f_sig_prot_abs(sigman)) = TRUE)
All given requirements have been modelled into predicates using the process described here. How-
ever the calculus on integers was not completely satisfactory, even though we worked with fixed point
reals, integer computation introduces errors when using integer division. So in some cases, we had to
replace an equality predicate, by a definition stating that two integers are distant from less than a given
epsilon. Those epsilon values were explicitely put back into XML input files, so that the safety depart-
ment could agree, or not, with those values. Fortunately, all the computations were pretty basic, so
the limitations of the B language were not too much of a constraint. However, if we had to model real
floating point calculus with scientific operators like exponential or trigonometry operators, we would
need to extend somehow the B language or the tools, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.5 Verifying and testing properties
The B model is built property by property. After producing a property, the model developer exercises
it against a nominal example through the tool chain based on Rodin plug-ins, since it is easier to use
on unfinished models. If the property check fails, then the problem is tracked down just like software
debugging. The Rodin plug-in tool displays the value (true/false) of all sub predicates, so we can
explore the predicate, searching for something unexpected. This exploration is usually very effective
and leads to the problem, which could be either a data, a model or a property error.
When the development of a property is complete, it should then be checked by a qualified person
different from the person who formalised the property. This way, we make sure that the property is
adequately formalised. However, experience shows that this process is not robust enough for complex
properties. For these properties, we write one or more unit tests in order to test the different kinds of
errors that could be expected from the predicate. Usually between one and three unit tests are written.
Of course, this test strategy does not intend to be complete, but it is very efficient to point out small
errors that could ruin the validation for that property. In one case, a definition providing a set of blocks
was erroneously always equal to the empty set, implying that properties using the definition always
succeeded.
2.6 Tool results
The model was written with no particular concern about the tools, except for one rule: when defining
a variable, instead of first typing it with pure typing predicates and then adding constraint predicates,
it is far more efficient to directly type it with a constraint set expression.
In this data validation process, a double tool chain is used in order to mitigate the risk of error in
these tools.
• The first tool chain is based on the Rodin AST plug-in and on the predicate evaluator core plug-in.
The interface plug-ins are proprietary one.
• The second tool chain is based on the ProB model checker. The interface part is also a proprietary
one.
Both tools needed an adjustment of their evaluation strategy due to intensive use of closure and
cartesian products with one argument being a large subset of integers. The tools had a tendency to
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perform an early evaluation of sets to be more efficient, however such a strategy does not pay off for
closure or cartesian product evaluation for which a lazy strategy proves to be much more efficient.
After taking into account these two issues, both tools were very efficient. The validation of a set of
configuration data containing several millons of integers took only a few minutes. No contradictory
result was produced by the double chain which, given the high differentiation of the development tools
—both in process and implementation techniques— gives a great confidence in the results.
3 Pros and Cons of the Process
3.1 Pros
A major benefit of this work is that the formal modelling activity focuses on the capital issue of un-
derstanding as clearly as possible the configuration data and their properties in all possible situations
and not only for the simple situations one can think of or for the examples represented by diagrams of
input documents.
One other major benefit of this work is that all properties, however hard to define on the railway
graph, were entirely modelled in B. None was left to external error prone informal verification.
• Well suited for CBTC configuration data: properties are neither too simple nor too complex.
• Reasonable validation time for both tools (a few minutes).
• The tools can handle large data (several megabytes).
• It is far more interesting to focus on high level formal modelling and on debugging data sets than
to hard code verifications.
• It may also take less time to validate configuration data with predicate evaluation tools, than to
develop safety-critical specific tools.
3.2 Limitations
• Ill-suited for scientific calculus.
• From an industrial point of view, we are looking for other domains than railway safety-critical
systems where this process can be applied with the same success.
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